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RULE 58'S DIRTY LITTLE SECRET: THE
PROBLEMATIC LACK OF UNIFORM
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 58 WITHIN THE FEDERAL
COURT SYSTEM
A conflict on an issue such as [Rule 58] is of importance and
concern to every litigant in a federal court, since . . . the
timeliness of appeals, as well as the timeliness of post-trial
motions, may turn on the question of when judgment is
entered.'
I.

INTRODUCTION: PREMATURE OR UNTIMELY: CONFLICrING APPELLATE
APPROACHES UNDER

RULE 58

Josh Moss filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to
challenge a sentence imposed following his guilty plea to two counts of
burglary. 2 The federal district court entered a memorandum opinion
and order denying his writ, but did not file a separate document
judgment order. More than a year later, Moss filed a document entitled
"Late Notice of Appeal." Although the appellate court requested that
Moss attach a memorandum addressing the reasons behind his late
appeal, he neglected to do so. However, the appellate court did not
dismiss Moss' claim for being untimely. Instead, the court remanded
Moss' claim to the district court for a judgment order to be entered.
Moss was given yet another thirty days to file a new notice of appeal
after the district court filed the judgment order.
In a different federal district court, Donna Lyman's employer has
just won a motion for summary judgment against her in a sexual
harassment claim. Lyman filed her notice of appeal thirty-three days
after summary judgment was entered in the court docket. In Lyman's
case, as in Moss' case, the judge or her clerk did not file a separate
document judgment order. Lyman's attorneys have researched Moss'

I United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 217-18 (1973) (per curiam).
2 Although the two scenarios that follow are based loosely on the experiences of the
appellants in Armstrong v. Ahitow, 36 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 1994), and Reynolds v. Golden Corral
Corp., 213 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2000), they are purely hypothetical. They are useful for
illustrating the complex issues when courts try to balance both equity and uniformity.
They are created from the author's imagination and are not intended to reflect any one
person or case.
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case and feel quite certain that her claim will also be remanded to the
district court for entry of a judgment order. Instead, the district court
dismisses Lyman's appeal as untimely. Lyman finds her case finished
and wonders how it is that her notice of appeal can be untimely when it

was only three days late while Moss' notice of appeal was too early even
though he filed it more than a year after the judge's opinion.
Although hypothetical, these two situations illustrate the current
tension within the federal appellate courts regarding jurisdiction over
untimely appeals where the district court judge or clerk has not entered a
separate document judgment order. Following a trial court's decision, a
party has a limited amount of time in which to appeal.3 The date runs

Allan Ides, The Authorityofa FederalDistrict Court to Proceed After a Notice ofAppeal Has
Been Filed, 143 F.R.D. 307, 307 (1992) (tracing the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to
show when a party can appeal from a final judgment and exactly when jurisdiction passes
from the district to the appellate court). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) states in
pertinent part
Appeal in a Civil Case.(a)
Except as provided in paragraph (a)(4) of this
(1)
Rule, in a civil case in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right
from a district court to a court of appeals the notice of appeal required
by Rule 3 must be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from;
but if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the
notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after such
entry. If a notice of appeal is mistakenly filed in the court of appeals,
the clerk of the court of appeals shall note thereon the date when the
clerk received the notice and send it to the clerk of the district court
and the notice will be treated as filed in the district court on the date so
noted.
A notice of appeal filed after the court announces
(2)
a decision or order but before the entry of judgment or order is treated
as filed on the date of and after the entry.
If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any
(3)
3 See

other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed
by this Rule 4(a), whichever period last expires.

(4)

If any party makes a timely motion of atype

specified immediately below, the time for appeal for all parties runs
from the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion
outstanding. This provision applies to a timely motion under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
for judgment under Rule 50(b);
(A)
to amend or make additional findings of
(B)
fact under Rule 52(b), whether or not granting the motion
would alter the judgment;
to alter or amend the judgment under
(C)
Rule 59;
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from the filing of the judgment order. The date this time begins to run is
extremely important to the appellant. If the appellate court declares an
4
earlier order as final, the opportunity to appeal is lost.

(D)
for attorney's fees under Rule 54 if a
district court under Rule 58 extends the time for appeal;
(E)
a new trial under Rule 59; or
(F)
for relief under Rule 60 if the motion is
served within 10 days after the entry of judgment
A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of the
judgment but before dispostion of any of the above motions is
ineffective to appeal from the judgment or order, or part thereof,
specified in the notice of appeal, until the date of the entry of the order
disposing of the last such motion outstanding. Appellate review of an
order disposing of any of the above motions requires the party, in
compliance with Appellate Rule 3(c), to amend a previously filed
notice of appeal. A party intending to challenge an alteration or
amendment of the judgment shall file an amended notice of appeal
within the time prescribed by this Rule 4 measured from the entry of
the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding. No additional
fees will be required for filing an amended notice.
(5)
The district court, upon a showing of excusable
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
prescribed by this Rule 4(a). Any such motion which is filed before the
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the court
otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after
expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in
accordance with local rules. No such extension shall exceed 30 days
past such prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order
granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
(6)
The district court, if it finds (a) that a party entitled
to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did not receive such notice
from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry and (b) that no
party would be prejudiced, may, upon motion filed within 180 days of
entry of the judgment or order or within 7 days of receipt of such
notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal for a period of
14 days from the date of entry of the order reopening the time for
appeal.
(7)
A judgment or order is entered within the
meaning of this Rule 4(a) when it is entered in compliance with Rules
58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). See generally Charles W. Adams, The Timing of Appeals Under Rule
4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 123 F.R.D. 371 (1989) (providing more
information on the application of Appellate Rule 4(a)).
4 See Ides, supra note 3, at 313 (stating that a notice of appeal prior to the entry of an
appealable judgment is a nullity). However, if the notice is filed outside the parameters
established by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), then the appellate court is without
jurisdiction, and the district court may proceed as if no appeal had been filed. Id.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 (Rule 58) attempts to solidify this
date to establish judicial certainty.5 Rule 58 states that a judge or his or
her clerk must file a single page separate document judgment order at
the end of every case.6 This alerts the parties that the trial court has
made a final decision in their case and it also signals that the time to file
an appeal has begun. 7 Without this judgment order, parties may be
unsure whether the district court's order was meant to adjudicate all the
claims or whether the court still intended to hear post-trial motions and
motions on other claims within the case. Without the certainty of a Rule
58 judgment order, cases can linger for years; notices of appeal, which
would normally be considered untimely, could be considered premature
because they are filed before the district court fies the Rule 58 judgment
order.8 The lack of a Rule 58 order often adds to party confusion over
filing dates and renders judicial certainty unascertainable.
This Note begins by presenting a background of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, focusing on Rule 58 and the developing Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 9 Part M charts the confusion in the lower federal courts
and discusses an amendment proposed to the Civil Rules Advisory
s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 states:

Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b): (1) upon a general verdict of a
jury, or upon a decision by the court that a party shall recover only a
sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be denied, the clerk, unless
the court otherwise orders, shall forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the
judgment without awaiting any direction by the court; (2) upon a
decision by the court granting other relief, or upon a special verdict or
a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, the court
shall promptly approve the form of the judgment, and the clerk shall
thereupon enter it. Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate
document A judgment is effective only when so set forth and when
entered as provided in Rule 79(a). Entry of the judgment shall not be
delayed, nor the time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or
award fees, except that, when a timely motion for attorneys' fees is
made under Rule 54(d)(2), the court, before a notice of appeal has been
filed and has become effective, may order that the motion have the
same effect under Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure as a timely motion under Rule 59. Attorneys shall not
submit forms of judgment except under direction of the court, and
these directions shall not be given as a matter of course.
FED. R. Civ. P. 58.
6 See id.; see also supra note 5 (reproducing Rule 58).
7 See, e.g., Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 US. 292. 302-03 (1993); Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435
US. 381, 382-84 (1978); United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216,217-18 (1973); Jung v. K &
D. Mining Co., 356 US. 335, 336-37 (1958); United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co.,
356 US. 227,231-33(1958).
8
Ides, supm note 3, at 313.
9 See infra Part II.
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Committee that will eliminate a majority of the confusion. 10 Finally, Part
IV proffers an addition to the proposed amendment that will leave the
courts some opportunity for equity when applying Rule 58.11
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 58

Before analyzing the current state of Rule 58 jurisprudence, one must
understand the reasoning behind the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the history of Rule 58 specifically. Part A traces the
history of the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 12 Part B
explores the text of Rule 58.13 Finally, Part C traces and discusses the
Supreme Court's decisions on the application of Rule 58, as well as the
4
legislature's reactions to those decisions.
A. History and Passageof the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
[Ilt was inevitable that federal procedure along with
substantially all other modern systems should eventually
jettison the unseemly practiceof turning a suitor out of court
because he had come in at the wrong door; and that it should
recognize that the fact-situations of life often embrace both
legal and equitable issues which demand the simple practiceof
affording complete relief,legal and equitable, in one action. s
In 1792, the Permanent Process Act made the first step toward what
have become the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by conferring upon
16
the Supreme Court the power to create rules for the federal courts.
However, Congress withdrew this power from the Court eighty years

"'

See infra Part III.

n See infra Part IV.
12 See infra Part [V.A.
13 See infra Part W.B.
14 See infra Part IV.C.
15
Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure,44 YALE -J. 387,415

(1935) (tracing the history of the merger between law and equity).
16Jay S. Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversaryof the FederalRdes of Civil Procedure: l4hat Did
the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L REv. 351, 353 (1987). Following passage of the
Permanent Process Act, the Court promulgated two sets of equity rules, one in 1822 and
one twenty years later. Clark & Moore, supranote 15, at 398. These sets of equity rules did
not establish a new equity procedure but were mainly declaratory of the old. It It was not
until the current Equity Rules were promulgated in 1912 that equity procedure was
completely modernized. Id. The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure marked
the end of a long struggle for reform aimed at providing uniform procedural rules for more
efficient federal court practice. Goodman, supra, at 351.
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later by passing the Conformity Act of 1872.17 Under the Conformity
Act, the federal courts were required to follow "as near as may be" the
practices and procedures of the state in which they sat.18
The ambiguities that grew around the Conformity Act's application
and varying results made federal practice confusing and frustrating for
attorneys and judges. 19 Although the Conformity Act perpetuated the
distinction between law and equity, a majority of the states began to
abandon the Act in favor of their own codes. 20 In 1848, New York
adopted the Field Code, which represented a reformed code of civil
procedure. 21 This code was adopted with little change in a number of
& Moore, supra note 15, at 392. Section Five of the Conformity Act reads:
That the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in
other than equity and admiralty causes in the circuit and district courts
of the United States shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice,
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in
like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such circuit
or district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary
notwithstanding: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained
shall alter the rules of evidence under the laws of the United States,
and as practiced in the courts thereof.
Id. at 401; see id. at 401-09 (discussing the Conformity Act and its purported inadequacies);
see also Goodman, supra note 16, at 353.
17Clark

18 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALrrY 54 (1992). The statute exempted

the rules of evidence from its coverage. let During the following years, decisions by
federal courts carved out other exemptions from the rule, weakening its impact on the
federal court system. Id. For example, "in 1889 the Supreme Court declared that the
statute did not apply to a federal judge's general administration of his court or limit his
inherent common law powers to process cases." Id.; see also Charles E. Clark, The Challenge
of a New Federal Civil Procedure, 20 (fORNELL LQ. 443, 451 (1934-35) [hereinafter Clark,
Challenge] (describing the limits of the Conformity Act, especially under its "as near as may
be" requirement).
19PURCELL, supranote 18, at 54. To successfully litigate a case removed to federal court, an
attorney either had to have knowledge of the workings of the local federal system or had to
perform some serious research. Id. This often resulted in cases costing much more than
they were worth in hours of research alone. Id.
2 Goodman, supra note 16, at 354. In fact, by 1930 only five or six states still had divided
law and equity systems. Clark, Challenge, supranote 18, at 450.

m

LEwis MAYERS, THE MACHINERY OF JusnCE 34 (1973); see also CHARLES E. CLARK,

(2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter CLARK,
HANDBOOK] (describing the passage and characteristics of the 1848 Field Code). Although
the Field Code of 1848 merged law and equity, it should not be read as a parent to the
Federal Rules. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L REV. 909, 932 (1987). Subrin contends
that the Field Code contained more concern for common law procedure than most scholars
believe. Id. Rather than seeing the Field Code as a system that threw out the legal court
system and replaced it with one completely comprised of equity, the framers of the Field
Code were trying to return to the time when equity was not so complicated as it was in
1848. Id. at 933. According to Subrin, instead of equity's ideas of discretion and flexibility,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 21-23
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other states and represented the first major step in the process of
rationalizing and modernizing civil procedure.22 Additionally, in 1886
the American Bar Association endorsed a proposal to create a federal
code in response to growing pressures for a uniform system for federal
procedure.2 3
To achieve partial reform, the American Bar Association drafted and
sponsored the Law and Equity Act of 1915 (Act), which created modem
procedures and provided a code system for the equity courts. 24 Despite

the Field Code revolved around "swift, economic, and predictable enforcement of discrete,
carefully articulated rights." Id. at 935.
2 MAYERS, supra note 21, at 34. However, the code quickly degenerated into a complex
system attorneys would have to wade through to find answers to procedural questions. I.
P. CALLISON, COURTS OF INJUSTICE 452 (1956).

Originally, the code contained only 391

sections, but by 1920 it had gained over 3000 new sections and comprised over 1000 finely
printed pages. Id. This was at least partially attributable to the 1877 passage of the Throop
Code in New York that contained amendments to the Field Code, completely riddling it
with unnecessary confusion. Id. at 625. The Throop Code was supported by formalists
who were seemingly unhappy without a multiplicity of technical rules that could cover
absolutely any situation. Id.
z Goodman, supra note 16, at 354. The American Bar Association's drive against the
Conformity Act gained momentum when Thomas W. Shelton was named head of the
American Bar Association's Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure. Id. Shelton was
one of a number of national bar leaders, including William Howard Taft, who worked
toward code reform and procedural reform Id. The goal of these bar leaders was to place
the rule-making authority directly in the United States Supreme Court. Id. Taft
complained about the lack of continuity in the federal judicial system as well as the
tendency of each federal judge to insist on "paddling his own canoe." Warren E. Burger,
The Courts on Trial, in DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 5 (1990). Taft delivered an address at the 1922
meeting of the American Bar Association, discussing the feasibility of abolishing the
distinctions between law and equity altogether. Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of RuleMaking Power to the Supreme Courtof the United States, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1116, 1120 (1933-34).
Additionally, Taft urged that, if such a reform were to be undertaken, it should be done by
the Supreme Court and not by Congress. Id. This suggestion met with the immediate
approval of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, and the bill granting the rulemaking power to the Supreme Court was amended to include a provision authorizing the
promulgation of rules unifying legal and equitable procedure. Id.
24 PURCELL, supra note 18, at 207. This was certainly not the end of the reform efforts. Id
Four systems remained in contention within the federal system: state rules under the
Conformity Act; a general federal system, which combined federal statutes and provisions
that limited the Conformity Act the antiquated English chancery system as modernized by
the Equity Rules of 1812; and the new unified code system. Clark, Challenge, supra note 18,
at 451; see also Clark, Challenge, supra note 18, at 453-55 (listing eight sample problems
which had arisen under the Conformity Act); Goodman, supra note 16, at 354 (discussing
additional information on the resolution of the four-system controversy). For example,
"[i]n the event of a mistake in the choice of a form of action, even though the suit should
now not fail, a formal transfer to the other 'side' of court" was required under the
Conformity Act Clark, Challenge, supra note 18, at 453. This prevented a "speedy dispatch
of business and occasion[ed] much difficulty for the court in deciding first as to the
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its general utility, the Act created some procedural confusion and
discrepancy.2 5 By the end of 1918, forty-six state bar associations
supported proposed changes to the federal system, pressuring the
federal government for reform.2 6 However, opposition within the Senate
blocked the passage of a proposed enabling act that would have given
the Supreme Court power to create a federal system of procedural rules
for almost twenty years.27 The opposition reasoned that a federal
uniform system would destroy uniformity in each state court, resulting
in confusion for lawyers practicing within each affected state; whereas
under the Conformity Act, attorneys could rely on their familiar state
2
rules when litigating in the federal system. 8
After almost two decades of resistance within the Senate, the reform
movement gaiied strength with prominent supporters, including
President Franklin Roosevelt and Attorney General Homer S.
Cummings, and Congress passed the Enabling Act of 1934.29 The

necessity of a transfer and then as to the effect of the mistake inthe form of trial and the
appeal." Id. at 453-54. When Clark was writin& considerable differences still existed on
these points in the lower federal courts. Id. at 453-55. The creation of a set of federal rules
of civil procedure had been an issue of interest to the American Bar Association practically
from the time of its formation in 1873. CLARK, HANDBooK,supra note 21, at 34 (tracing the
history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, beginning in 1912 with the formation of the
Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure).
2 PURCELL, supra note 18, at 207. William Howard Taft, then-Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, admitted that the Law and Equity Act was far from perfect in a speech given at the
1914 annual meeting of the American Bar Association. Id. However, he explained that it
would not disadvantage plaintiffs as it would save them the delay and expense of
defending a separate suit in equity. Id. In 1922 Taft recommended abolishing entirely the
distinction between law and equity. Goodman, supra note 16, at 354-55.
2 Goodman, supra note 16, at 354 (tracing the history of the reformation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
27Clark, Challenge, supra note 18, at 446-47; Goodman, supra note 16, at 355. The opposition
was led by Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana, who had long been a chairman of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary and argued against forcing local attorneys to learn a
new procedure for practice in the federal courts. Clark, Chalenge, supra note 18, at 446-47.
Some of his objections seemed to suggest that the fairly satisfactory system of the western
states should not be superseded in the federal courts by an unsatisfactory system, probably
that of New York Id. at 447. Senator Walsh died as he was at the point of assuming office
as Attorney General of the United States. I1 In his place, Homer Cummings was
appointed Attorney General and quickly began pushing for federal procedural reform. Id.;
see Goodman, spra note 16, at 355 (discussing the history of the passage of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
n Goodman, supra note 16, at 355. Walsh contended that a lawyer would have to know the
federal and state rules in order to practice law in any given state rather than knowing only
one system that could be used in either court system within the state. Id.
29
PURCELL, supra note 18, at 227. The Enabling Act reads:
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Enabling Act empowered the Supreme Court to create a system of
general rules of pleading and practice in civil actions. 30 The Court was

Be it enacted... That the Supreme Court of the United States shall have
the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the
United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge,
enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litiganL They shall
take effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws
in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
Section 2. The court may at any time unite the general rules prescribed
by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one
form of civil action and procedure for both: provided, however, That in
such union of rules the right of trial by jury as at common law and
declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution shall be
preserved to the parties inviolate. Such united rules shall not take
effect until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney
General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the
close of such session.
Supreme Court Adopts Rules for Civil Procedure in Federal District Courts, 24 A.B.A. J. 97, 101
(1938) [hereinafter Supreme Court Adopts Rules]. The first section of the Enabling Act
provides that the statutes authorizing the drafting of equity and admiralty rules by the
Court "shall take effect six months after their promulgation." CLARK, HANDBOK, supra
note 21, at 42. Additionally, this section has the important provision, "and thereafter all
laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect." Id. Because the dear intent
of the Enabling Act was to provide for a complete system of rule-making in civil actions,
the two sections should be construed as not in opposition to each other, but as making an
integrated whole covering the entire subject. Id. at 43. Connor Hall, a West Virginia lawyer
who staunchly opposed the Enabling Act, argued that its supporters had not thought
through the process one follows to apply law to a case. Subrin, supra note 21, at 994. Hall
argued that, although practice is merely a tool, "there must be a way to bring causes to the
attention of the court; to adduce proof, to bear argument; to conclude the cause; to give the
proper judgment; to take the proper steps for enforcing it...." Id. Hall did not believe in
the idea of throwing out the contemporary system and starting over because the past
reformers had thought this problem through just as thoroughly as they were doing. Id.
Hall continued:
rTlhe attempt to obtain entire simplicity and lack of technicality
through rules is a will-o'-the-wisp.... If a group of mariners tired of
studying their complicated charts should decide to throw them away
and adopt more simple maps, they would not thereby do away with
the air and water currents through which they must pass, or the
icebergs or the reefs in their course.
Id. at 995; see also Alexander Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L REV. 1057,1057-58 (1955) [hereinafter Holtzoff, Origin) (tracing the
struggle Congress faced in enacting the Enabling Act). See generallySunderland, supra note
23 (discussing the passage of the Enabling Act).
30 PURCELL, supra note 18, at 232-33. The existence of a rule-making power in the courts has
been recognized as a historical development stemming from early English law. Charles W.
Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Madng, 55
MICH. L REV. 623,624 (1957). This power may date back as far as 1457, the thirty-fifth year
of the reign of Henry VI. Id.
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also given the authority to unite the rules of equity and law into a single
procedural system. 31
After Congress passed the Enabling Act, the Supreme Court
appointed a fourteen-member Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil
Procedure. 32 The duties of the Advisory Committee included: first,
31PURCELL, supra note 18, at 232-33. In a 1935 speech to the American Law Institute, Chief

Justice Charles Evans Hughes spoke of the goals of the Supreme Court in considering the
rules to be proscribed:
It is manifest that the goal we seek is a simplified practice which will
strip procedure of unnecessary forms, technicalities and distinctions,
and permit the advance of causes to the decision of their merits with a
minimum of procedural encumbrances. It is also apparent that in
seeking that end we should not be fettered by being compelled to
maintain the historic separation of the procedural systems of law and
equity.
Goodman, supra note 16, at 355-56. Additionally, Hughes stated:
After careful consideration, the Court has decided not to prepare rules
limited to common law cases but to proceed with the preparation of a
unified system of rules for cases in equity and actions at law, 'so as to
secure one form of civil action and procedure for both,' so far as this
may be done without the violation of any substantive right
In entering upon this task, the Court will welcome the aid of the Bench
and Bar, of the Department of Justice, and of all those interested in the
improvement of procedure. It is manifest, however, that the Court
must itself assume the responsibility of preparing the rules.
In order that the Court may be suitably aided in this undertaking, the
Court will shortly announce the appointment of an Advisory
Committee, responsible to the Court, which will be called upon for
such assistance as the Court may from time to time require. The
Committee will be in touch with all helpful agencies, with the
Department of Justice, with lawyers and expert students of procedure,
and will be able to bring to the Court aid and advice of the highest
value.
Clark, Ciualenge, supra note 18, at 458; see KNEm BERNARD UMBREIT, OUR ELEVEN CHIEF
JUSTICES 452-500 (1938) (giving more biographical information on Chief Justice Hughes).
Certain expressions in the Constitution had been thought to cast doubt on the validity of
the union between law and equity, but these were not more explicit than similar provisions
in state constitutions which did not prevent the union. Clark & Moore, supra note 15, at
394. These expressions include the phrase in Article Three, Section Two, Clause One,
extending the judicial power of the United States "to all cases, in Law and Equity"; the
phrase in the Seventh Amendment preserving the right of trial by jury in actions at law;
and the phrase in the Eleventh Amendment providing that the federal judicial power shall
not be construed to extend "to any suit in law or equity" against a state by a citizen of
another state or a foreign country. Id. at 394-95.
32 Supreme Court Adopts Rules, supra note 29, at 97 (celebrating the great task of reforming
the federal rules accomplished by a combination of the bench and the bar). The Advisory
Committee was comprised of: William D. Mitchell of New York City, New York,
Chairman; Scott M. Loftin of Jacksonville, Florida, President of the American Bar
Association; George W. Wickersham of New York City, New York, President of the
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ensuring conformity between state and federal courts sitting in the same
state; second, regulating the procedure in the federal courts by court
rules rather than by legislation; and third, establishing uniformity in
practice among all the various federal courts.3 3 Professor Charles E.
Clark, who drafted many of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
believed that procedure should be completely separate from substance,
and this translated into his continued effort to merge law and equity into
a single civil action instead of separate special or fact pleading. 34
The Advisory Committee drafted a complete set of rules and, in
1938, submitted the proposed rules to Congress.35 These rules set forth a
American Law Institute; Wilbur H. Cherry of Minneapolis, Minnesota, Professor of Law at
the University of Minnesota; Charles E. Clark of New Haven, Connecticut, Dean of the Law
School of Yale University; Armistead M. Dobie of University, Virginia, Dean of the Law
School of the University of Virginia; Robert G. Dodge of Boston, Massachusetts; George
Donworth of Seattle, Washington; Joseph G. Gamble of Des Moines, Iowa; Monte M.
Lemann of New Orleans, Louisiana; Edmund M. Morgan of Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Professor of Law at Harvard University; Warren Orney, Jr., of San Francisco, California;
Edson R. Sunderland of Ann Arbor, Michigan, Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan; and Edgar B. Tolman of Chicago, Illinois, Secretary. Id. at 97-98. Chairman
Mitchell was a former Attorney General of the United States. Goodman, supranote 16, at
356. Mitchell was chosen as the chairman at least in part because of a powerful letter he
wrote to Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes setting forth the need for full reform rather
than reformation in small piecemeal steps. Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil
Rules, 58 COLuM. L. REv. 435, 439 (1958) [hereinafter Clark, Two Decades]. Although the
committee was composed of both conservatives and liberals, there was no one on the
committee to speak up for the small firm, the small case, or the small client Subrin, supra
note 21, at 971-72. The committee met for the first time in Chicago on June 20, 1935.
Supreme Court Adopts Rules, supra note 29, at 98; see Clark, Two Decades, supra, at 435-51
(giving a first-hand account of the struggles of the Advisory Committee).
33
Sunderland, supra note 23, at 1128 (tracing the history of the Enabling Act and its effect
on the power of the Supreme Court). These goals were indicated by the report of the
Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure. Id. In the face of such conflicting objectives,
the committee faced the challenge of selecting a solution which would offer the best
balance of advantages. Id.
3 See Clark, Two Decades, supra note 3Z at 435-51 (showing the success of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure after their first twenty years). Clark was a professor at the Yale
University Law School and was the driving force behind the majority of the rules. Id.
Clark also believed in the freedom to join diverse claims and various parties in a single
action. Id. at 438. Clark tirelessly drafted and re-drafted the rules for the Advisory
Committee. Goodman, supra note 16, at 356-57 (following the building of the reform
movement from the passage of the Enabling Act to the formation of the Advisory
Committee); Subrin, supra note 21, at 961-71 (providing biographical information on
Charles E. Clark, including his early interest in procedure and his part in judicial reform).
3s Goodman, supra note 16, at 357. The rules were presented to Congress in a 126-page
booklet, supplemented by a 95-page document with the Advisory Committee's Notes to
accompany the rules. Id. at 358-59. Although this seemed like the logical end to the work
of the Advisory Committee, Charles E. Clark still believed there to be a need for the
Advisory Committee twenty years after the rules had been adopted. Clark, Two Decades,
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uniform federal procedural system to operate in all federal courts,
representing a complete separation from the Conformity Act.3' For
example, Rule 2 abolished the distinction between law and equity by
creating one form of action, a "civil action." 37
By the time the rules reached Congress, most of the objectionable
parts had been favorably amended.38 Concerns remained, however, that
the new rules would have an adverse effect on state attorneys who
would now be required to learn an entirely new set of rules in order to
litigate federal trials.39 Additionally, critics voiced concern over whether

supra note 32. at 443-47. Clark argued that there should be a body under the auspice of the
judicial branch to look at complaints and suggestions about the rules without the Supreme
Court having to take time away from its other duties to perform the kind of research some
of the suggestions may entail. Id. at 443. In May 1936, the Advisory Committee had
suggested in its first report that there be established a standing committee, meeting
annually (or more often) and submitting annual reports to the Supreme Court Id. at 445.
This idea was supported quite widely and was the basis of a resolution adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1942. Id.
36 PURCELL, supra note 18, at 233 (tracing the question of the effect which the merger of law
and equity would have on the right to a jury trial).
3
7 Id. However, there was some question as to the survival of the right to a jury trial both
because of the supposedly equitable nature of declaratory relief and because of the
complete merger of law and equity in the federal system. Il For two decades, the
Supreme Court refused to resolve the question of the scope of the right to a jury trial in
light of the new rules. Id. However, many lower federal courts were protecting the right to
jury trials in declaratory judgment actions. Il Finally, between 1959 and 1962, the
Supreme Court answered the question, actually broadening the right. Id. The Court
abandoned the historical approach the lower courts had been using and replaced it with a
new dynamic approach that expanded the category of issues that warranted a jury trial and
also ensured that any factual issue in a case that bore on a legal claim would be tried by a
jury. Id. In the new rules, Rules 18 through 20 allowed for more liberal joinder of parties
and claims, and Rules 26 through 37 represented radical changes in the deposition and
discovery provisions. Goodman, supra note 16, at 359. Before the new rules, federal
discovery was almost nonexistent. Id. at 360. The federal system allowed only four
possible sources of discovery, all of which were limited. Id. At law, statutes allowed the
taking of depositions only under court order and only for the preservation of testimony. Id.
Only Equity Rule 58 allowed for pretrial discovery by interrogatories, but only by parties.
Id. These very limited federal rules could not be supplemented by more liberal state rules
because the Supreme Court had held that the federal statutes were controlling on these
points.
Id.
38
Goodman, supra note 16, at 360 (illustrating the contents of the new Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure). Despite opposition from groups such as the then rival AFL and C0, the
testimony before the committee mostly supported adoption of the rules. Id.
3 Id. at 361 (tracing the arguments on each side of the question of whether attorneys should
be required to learn a separate system to litigate in federal rather than state courts).
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the new liberal rules would increase either litigation or the number of
unfounded claims brought in the federal system. 40

In March of 1938, the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on
the proposed rules. 41 The testimony heard by the committee
overwhelmingly supported the rules' adoption.42 In April and May of
1938, a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings
on the new rules, questioning many of the same witnesses as the House
Committee. 43 Those in favor of the rules vocalized their support, saying
that the proposed rules should be passed as soon as possible. 44 Congress

40 Id. at 360. Judge Edward R. Finch of the New York Court of Appeals voiced his concern

that the rules, particularly the discovery rules, would add to the nuisance of litigation and
that defendants would not have the protection they had under the previous rules. Id.
Additionally, Finch believed that the incentive to settle cases would increase because
plaintiffs had more advantages. Id. Finch's solution to his concerns was to award fees to
defense counsel if they prevailed. Id.
41 Id. at 361. The same questions were raised in the House committee's hearings regarding
whether the rules would be unfair to state attorneys. Id. The advocates of the Rules
frequently cited the case of Iarndyce v. Jarndyce in Charles Dickens' novel Bleak House as the
kind of technicality-driven procedural system they were trying to avoid. Subrin, supra note
21, at 982 (showing how courts had to cope with an undisciplined equity system). Dickens
wrote Bleak House to mirror the problems of the Chancery Court in England at the time.
WILLIAM S. HoLDswORTH, CHARLES DICKENS AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN 85 (1972). The practice
at Chancery Court "had become so technical, and its procedure had become so slow, that
the length of time taken to decide even uncontested cases amounted to a denial of justice."
Id. at 86. This resulted because "for centuries, there had been no adequate supervision
either of the officials, or of the procedural rules of the court" Id.
'Not [heard] of Jarndyce and Jarndyce? . . . 'Not [heard] of one of the
greatest Chancery suits known? Not of Jarndyce and Jarndyce - the a - in itself a monument of Chancery practice. In which (I would say)
every difficulty, every contingency, every masterly fiction, every form
of procedure known in that court, is represented over and over again?
It is a cause that could not exist, out of this free and great country. I
should say that the aggregate of costs in Jarndyce and Jamdyce ...
amounts at the present hour to from
SIX-TY TO SEVEN-TY
THOUSAND POUNDS.'
CHARLES DicKENs, BLEAK HOUSE 68 (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1853).
42
Goodman, supranote 16, at 362 (discussing the few negative comments on the rules).
43Id.The Enabling Act called for adoption to take place ninety days after the adjournment
of the Seventy-Fifth Congress, while Senator William H. King of Utah recommended that
be changed to a year. Id. However, Senator King and his supporters were unable to gain
much support for the delay and the original date was maintained. Id.
4Id. at 363. House Judiciary Committee Chairperson Hatton W. Sumners noted that the
rules would "materially reduce the uncertainty, delay, expense, and the likelihood that
cases may be decided on technical points and procedure [having] no relation to the just
determination of the controversy on its merits." Id.
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subsequently adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
became effective on September 16, 1938. 45
B. The Text of FederalRule of Civil Procedure58

Tihe purpose of the administrationof justice is to assure to
every individual the substantive rights accorded to him by
law. This objective, however, cannot be successfully attained
unless an efficient machinery is established for this
purpose .... Without an effective machinery for their

enforcement... substantive rights become but dross.46

The original rules were adopted on
December 20, 1937, and received some minor changes before going into effect on
September 16, 1938. Id. The adoption of these initial rules "went far toward settling the
manner of proceeding and the validity of various provisions, including not only the union
of law and equity, but also rules of evidence and of appellate procedure..., service of
process,... extensive examination, and the like." Id. at 441. The majority of the ideas in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure come from equity, rather than common law, including
the flexibility and permissiveness in pleading, joinder, and discovery. Subrin, supra note
21, at 922 (illustrating the dominance of equity within the current Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); see also Goodman, supranote 16, at 364 (giving a history of the initial adoption
of the Rules). Although under attack today for being too cumbersome and adding undue
cost to litigation, the rules when adopted were hailed as being a savior to the federal
judicial system and were copied by the states. Warren E.Burger, A Generationof Change, in
DELIVERY OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 62, 66; see also Clark, Thm Decades, supra note 32 at
435 (stating that within the first twenty years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one
quarter of the states had adopted the entire set of rules, nearly half the states had adopted
substantial portions of the rules, and hardly a local jurisdiction remained unaffected by the
passage of the rules). Clark lists Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, Utah,
and Wyoming as jurisdictions that had adopted the rules completely before 1958. Id. at n.2.
Substantial provisions had also been adopted in Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Texas, and Washington. Id. Also, Clark stated that Alabama had proposed the rules, but
they had not yet been adopted by the state legislature in 1958. Id.Additionally, although
there had been many congressional proposals for change within the Rules during the first
twenty years of their existence, Congress withstood all attempts to obtain passage of any
procedural statutes of any consequence. Id. at 443; see also Charles E. Clark, The Proper
Function of the Supreme Court's Federal Rules Cammittee, 28 A.B.A. J. 521, 521-25 (1942)
[hereinafter Clark, Function] (supporting a permanent Advisory Committee to deal with
any problems that came up with interpretation or enforcement of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure). For more information on the immediate acceptance of the rules, see generally
Charles E. Clark & Charles Alan Wright, The Judicial Council and the Rule-Making Pour: A
Dissent and a Protest, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 346 (1949-50); Alexander Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at
the Rudes After Fifteen Years of Use, 15 F.R.D. 155 (1954) [hereinafter Holtzoff, Judge].
46 Holtzoff, Judge, supra note 45, at 155. "Dross" is defined as: (1) a waste product or an
impurity, especially an oxide, formed on the surface of molten metal; (2) worthless,
45 Clark, Two Decades, supra note 32, at 436 n.8.
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Rule 58 is intended to resolve the "old, old question of when a
judgment [is] a judgment." 47 Clause one of the first sentence of Rule 58
states that upon a general verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the
court, a party shall recover or shall have all relief be denied and the clerk
shall sign and enter the judgment without awaiting direction by the
court.48 Clause two asserts that if the court grants other relief or if there
is a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to
interrogatories, the court shall promptly approve the judgment and the
clerk shall enter it. 49 Rule 58 specifically states that a judgment shall be
set forth on a separate document in every case and shall not be effective
if not entered as provided in Rule 79(a), which gives instructions to the
court clerk on how to enter the judgment into the docketso The entry of

commonplace, or trivial matter."He was wide-awake and his mind worked dearly, purged
of all dross." (Vladimir Nabokov). THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICIONARY 565 (3d ed. 1992).
47 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 6 (1995) (citing Cedar

Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Fidelity Gas Co., 238 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1956)). In Cedar Creek, the
district judge signed a fourteen page memorandum on June 12,1956, which constituted his
opinion in the case and not a judgment order. Cedar Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Fidelity Gas
Co., 238 F.2d 298, 299 (9th Cir. 1956). Simultaneously, the judge also signed a fifteen page
document titled "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" that concluded with the
statement "Judgement [sic] is hereby Ordered to be entered accordingly." Id. The judge's
clerk filed both papers and mailed copies to each party. Id. On June 19, the defendants
filed their tax cost bill, assuming the case was finished. Id. On July Z the judge signed a
formal written judgment that was prepared for the judge by the defendant's counsel. Id.
This document was filed July 3. Id. The plaintiffs filed an appeal on July 27, and the
defendants fied a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the appeal was more than thirty
days past the filing of the judgment. Id. at 298-99. The court looked to the wording of the
June 12 documents and saw that the wording was forward looking- "Ordered to be
entered." Id. at 300. Despite the court's desire to grant the motion to dismiss, the
document of July 2 was held to be the judgment order in the matter and the motion to
dismiss the appeal was denied. Id. at 301.
4 See FED. R CIv. P. 58; see also supranote 5 (reproducing Rule 58).
4 FED. R. CIv. P. 58; see also supra note 5 (reproducing Rule 58).
s0 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a) states:
(a) Civil Docket. The clerk shall keep a book known as "civil docket"
of such form and style as may be prescribed by the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts with the approval of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, and shall enter therein
each civil action to which these rules are made applicable. Actions
shall be assigned consecutive file numbers. The file number of each
action shall be noted on the folio of the docket whereon the first entry
of the action is made. All papers filed with the clerk, all process issued
and returns made thereon, all appearances, orders, verdicts, and
judgments shall be entered chronologically in the civil docket on the
folio assigned to the action and shall be marked with its fie number.
These entries shall be brief but shall show the nature of each paper
filed or writ issued and the substance of each order or judgment of the
court and of the returns showing execution of process. The entry of an
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judgment shall not be delayed in order to tax costs or award fees unless a
timely motion for attorneys' fees is made under Rule 54(d)(2).S In such
cases, the court may order that the motion have the same effect under
Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure as a timely
motion under Rule 59.52

order or judgment shall show the date the entry is made. When in an
action trial by jury has been properly demanded or ordered the clerk
shall enter the word "jury" on the folio assigned to that action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 79(a). See generally Michael Zachary, Article: Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Appellate Jurisdiction and the Separate Judgment and Docket Entry
Requirements, 40 N.Y.L SCH. L REv. 409 (1996) (discussing the interplay between Rules 58
and 79(a)).
51Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) states:
(2) Attorneys' Fees
(A) Claim for attorneys' fees and related nontaxable
expenses shall be made by motion unless the substantive law
governing the action provides for the recovery of such fees
as an element of damages to be proved at trial.
(B) Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the
court, the motion must be filed and served no later than 14
days after the entry of judgment must specify the judgment
and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the moving
party to the award; and must state the amount or provide a
fair estimate of the amount sought. If directed by the court,
the motion shall also disclose the terms of any agreement
with respect to fees to be paid for the services for which the
claim is made.
(C) On request of a party or class member, the court shall
afford an opportunity for adversary submissions with
respect to the motion in accordance with Rule 43(e) or Rule
78. The court may determine issues of liability for fees
before receiving submissions bearing on issues of evaluation
of services for which the court imposes liability. The court
shall find the facts and state its conclusions of law as
provided in Rule 52(a), and a judgment shall be set forth in a
separate document as provided in Rule 58.
(D) By local rule the court may establish special procedures
by which issues relating to such fees may be resolved
without extensive evidentiary hearings. In addition, the
court may refer issues relating to the value of services to a
special master under Rule 53 without regard to the provision
of subdivision (b) thereof and may refer a motion for
attorneys' fees to a magistrate judge under Rule 72(b) as if it
were a dispositive pretrial matter.
(E) The provisions of subparagraph (A) through (D) do not
apply to claims for fees and expenses as sanctions for
violations of these rules or under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
FED. R. CIv. P. 54(d)(2).
52 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 states:
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C. The Development of Rule 58 Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court was first confronted with Rule 58 controversy in
United States v. F.& M. Schaefer Brewing Co.,53 decided in April 1958.54
The Court granted certiorari to reconcile an asserted conflict between the

New Trial; Amendment of Judgments
(a) Grounds. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been
a trial
by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have
heretofore been granted in action at law in the courts of the United
States; and (2) in an action tried without a jury, for any of the reasons
for which rehearings have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in
the courts of the United States. On a motion for a new trial in an action
tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be filed no later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment
(c) Time for Serving Affidavits. When a motion for new trial is based
upon affidavits they shall be filed with the motion. The opposing
party has 10 days after service to file opposing affidavits, but that
period may be extended for up to 20 days, either by the court for good
cause or by the parties' written stipulation. The court may permit
reply affidavits.

(d) On Initiative of Court

No later than 10 days after entry of

judgment the court, on its own, may order a new trial for any reason
that would justify granting one on a party's motion. After giving the
parties notice and an opportunity to be heard, the court may grant a
timely motion for new trial for a reason not stated in the motion.
When granting a new trial on its own initiative or for a reason not
stated in the motion, the court shall specify the ground in its order.
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend
a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the
judgment
FED. R CIv. P. 59.
s 356 US. 227 (1958).
s4Id. The F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Company sued the United States government for
money that was allegedly illegally assessed and collected as federal stamp taxes and for the
interest on that money. Id. at 228. The district court judge made no finding of the dates of
the alleged payments but rather deferred to an earlier decision by a colleague and granted
the Schaefer's motion for summary judgment Id. at 229. The civil docket read: "April 14,
1955. Rayfiel, J. Decision rendered on motion for summary judgment. Motion granted.
See opinion on file." Id. On May 24, 1955, Schaefer's counsel presented the judge with a
form captioned "Judgment" which the judge signed. id. The clerk filed this paper along
with a decree against the government for the amount of $7769.37. Id. On July 21,1955, the
government filed its notice of appeal from the order entered on May 25, 1955. Id. at 230.
Schaefer's attorney moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the order of April 14 was the
true order and, therefore, the sixty days in which to appeal had passed. Id. The appellate
court agreed with Schaefer and dismissed the appeal. Id.
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circuits as to when an appeal could be brought.55 At that time, the
proper interpretation and uniform application of the provisions of the
Federal Rules were in jeopardy.5 6 The Court held that the requirements
of Rule 58 have not been met if an opinion does not resolve the appellate
court's question whether the judge intended the judgment to be his final
57
act in the case.
Less than one month later, in lung v. K. & D. Mining Co.,58 the Court
issued another decision regarding Rule 58.59 In Jung, the Court held that

ssld. at 230-31. Additionally, the Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the
proper interpretation and uniform application of the Federal Rules of Appellate and Civil
Procedure governing the time in which appeals may be brought. Id.
56Id. at 232-33. The Court stated.
While an opinion may embody a final decision, the question whether it
does so depends upon whether the judge has or has not dearly
declared his intention in this respect in his opinion. Therefore, when,
as here, the action is for money only - whether for a liquidated or an
unliquidated amount, as Rule 58 makes no such distinction - it is
necessary to determine whether the language of the opinion embodies
the essential elements of a judgment for money and dearly evidences
the judge's intention that it shall be his final act in the case.
Id. at 232.
57 Id. at 233. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision as to what constituted a Rule
58 separate judgment order. Id. The Court specifically mentioned that actions for money
are not resolved until the amount to be awarded is determined either expressly or by
reference. Id. Schaefer argued that the decision of April 14 mentioned the amount of
money that would be awarded because it mentioned the amount that he was suing for,
including the interest, but the court held that that was not enough because the judge would
not necessarily have to award Schaefer that much. Id. at 234. The dissent agreed with
Schaefer that he filed his claim for $776937 and that was the amount of money that the
judgment would have been for, even if it did not specifically say that within the April 14
decision. Id. at 237-38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the 1946
amendment to Rule 58 made it clear that the derk was supposed to enter the judgment into
the docket immediately without waiting for the filing of a formal judgment approved by
the court. Id. at 241. The 1946 amendment replaced "there be no recovery" with "all relief
be denied." Id. Additionally, the dissent argued that the deletion of the words "the entry
of a judgment" made it clear that it is the direction to recover that was the essential act and
not a direction to enter judgment or a direction framed in any particular manner. Id.
-8356 U.S. 335 (1958).
s9 Id. On May 10, 1955, the district court dismissed Jung's first amended complaint and
granted twenty days from that date to file an amended complaint. Id. at 336. On May 27,
1955, the district court overruled Jung's motion to vacate that order but granted another
twenty days from that date to file an amended complaint. Id. On March 25, 1957, Jung
filed a paper electing to stand on his first amended complaint instead of filing an amended
complaint. Id. That day, the district court dismissed the cause of action. Id. On April 16,
1957, Jung filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of March 25,1957. Id. However, the
appellate court held that the order of May 27, 1955, became the final judgment when Jung
failed to fie an amended complaint within the twenty days granted by the court. Id.
Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal as untimely. Id.
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a judgment that failed to direct that "all relief be denied" could not
constitute a final judgment. 60 Therefore, even though the notice of
appeal came almost two years after the filing of what the court of
appeals considered to be the final judgment order, the appeal filed was
61
still considered timely.
The Court's strong reliance on the phrase "all relief be denied" is
rooted in the 1946 amendments to Rule 58.62 In that year, two changes
were made in the wording of the rule to clarify the practice prescribed by
the original rule.6 First, the words "there be no recovery" were replaced
with the broader phrase "all relief be denied."" The second amendment
to Rule 58 was the clarification that judgments are to be entered
promptly by the clerk without waiting for the taxing of the costs.65
The Supreme Court did not address Rule 58 directly again until
United States v. Indrelunas in 1973.67 In Indrelunas, the civil docket entry
60Id.

at 337. Without the phrase "all relief be denied," the Court noted that the suit would
still be left pending for further proceedings either by amendment or the complaint or entry
of a final judgment. Id.
61Id. The Court noted that neither the appellee nor the district court - exercising power sua
sponte over its own calendar - took any step in the two years to put a definitive end to the
case and thereby fix an unequivocal terminal date for appealability. Id. Additionally, the
Court stated that the undesirability of useless delays in litigation is more than offset by the
hazards of confusion or misunderstanding as to the time for appeal. Id. The Court stated
that the appellate court's decision left the case unresolved because the complaint could
have been amended or a final judgment could have been entered. Id.
62Id.

28 U.S.C. app. at 784 (1994).
"Id. This more inclusive phrase made it clear that the clerk must immediately enter the
judgment in the specified situations without awaiting the filing of a formal judgment
approved by the court. Id. This phrase encompasses cases such as the denial of a
bankrupt's discharge where the relief sought is refused but there is not a literal denial of
recovery. Id.
65Id. In passing this amendment, the Advisory Committee noted that certain district court
decisions contradicted this rule, but the federal practice was long standing and well settled.
Id. The Advisory Committee noted that such district court rules contradicted the spirit of
Rule 58. Id. See generally Fowler v. Hamill, 139 US. 549 (1891) (dismissing an appeal from a
decree for the dismissal of a bill and for costs where the papers on appeal were not filed in
the circuit court within two years after the decree).
63

66411 US. 216 (1973) (per curiam).

Id. Indrelunas and a fellow corporate officer named Foiles brought action against the
government over a dispute relating to their responsibility to pay withholding taxes on a
corporation in which they were officers. Id. The district court found for Indrelunas and the
government appealed. Id. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, holding
that the government had missed the window in which to fie its notice of appeal pursuant
to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. Id. In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court
looked at the activities in the district court immediately preceding the questionable final
judgment order. Id. The Court found that the court of appeals had mistakenly believed
67
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for the District Court for the Northern District of llinois contained the
language, "Enter judgment on the verdict. Jury discharged."68 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the government's
appeal was untimely because it came nearly two years after the jury
verdict and its district court's civil docket entry.6' The appellate court
held that the separate document requirement of Rule 58 only applied to
the "complex" judgments described in clause two of that Rule. 70

that Rule 58 did not apply to this case because it did not fit into any of the categories listed
in clause two of the first sentence of the rule. Id. at 217. In fact, the appellate court had
admitted that it differed in opinion from the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits in regard to
this belief. Id. The Court stated that:.

[A] conflict on an issue such as this is of importance and concern to
every litigant in a federal court, since, as this case makes clear, the
timeliness of appeals, as well as the timeliness of post-trial motion,
may turn on the question of when judgment is entered. Consideration
of the petition for certiorari and the response has led us to conclude
that further briefs and oral arguments would not materially assist in
our disposition of the case and, for the reasons hereafter stated, we
grant certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Id. at 217-18.
6MId. at 218. In the district court, verdicts were returned in favor of both Indrelunas and his

fellow corporate officer Foiles and against the government using the wording'
'We, the jury, find for the plaintiff, Harry H. Foiles, and against the
defendant, United States of America, in the amount claimed...,'
'We, the jury, find against the defendant, United States of America, on
the counterclaim, and in favor of the plaintiff, Harry H. Foiles...,
'We, the jury, find against the third-party plaintiff, United States of
America, and in favor of the third-party defendant, Alphonse T.
Indrelunas.'
Id. Following these jury verdicts and the entry in the district court civil docket, there was
disagreement over the amount that Indrelunas and Foiles were to receive from the jury
verdict. Id. at 219. Some fourteen months later, on May 14,1970, a stipulation was filed in
the district court specifying the amount of refund the men were to receive. Id. Within sixty
days, the government filed a notice of appeal, but this appeal was not pursued. Id. Eight
months later, on February 25, 1971, on motion by the government, the district court filed
final judgment orders. Id. The government again filed a notice of appeal and it was this
notice that brought the case to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Id.
69 Id.

70 Id. The appellate court stated:

(When the jury verdict is clear and unequivocal, setting forth a
general verdict with reference to the sole question of liability and
where nothing remains to be decided and when no opinion or
memorandum is written, as is the situation described in clause (1) of
Rule 58, there is no requirement for a separate document to start the

time limits for appeal running.
Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 58 (listing the "complex" judgments in Rule 58, clause two); supra
note 5 (reproducing Rule 58).
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In Indrelunas, the Supreme Court observed that the separate
document requirement must be "mechanically applied" to all cases in
order to avoid new uncertainties as to the date of judgment.7'
Specifically, the Court noted that Rule 58 had been amended in 1963 to
remove uncertainties as to when a judgment is entered' 2 Clause one of
Rule 58 sets out simple judgments with recovery of a sum certain, of
costs, or of nothing, while clause two sets out more complex forms of
judgment. 3 Prior to 1963, there was considerable uncertainty over what
comprised an entry of judgment.74 To combat this uncertainty, amended
Rule 58 stated that a judgment was effective only when recorded on a
separate document. 75
The IndrelunasCourt found that the recording of "Enter judgment on
the verdict. Jury discharged," which had been entered almost two years
earlier, did not meet the separate document requirement of Rule 58.76
71 Indrelunas, 411

U.S. at 222. The Court stated:

(The 1963 amendment to Rule 58] represents a mechanical change that
would be subject to criticism for its formalism were it not for the fact
that something like this was needed to make certain when a judgment
becomes effective, which has a most important bearing, inter alia, on
the time for appeal and the making of post-judgment motions that go
to the finality of the judgment for purposes of appeal. ... Although
confusion may still arise at times, the current [post-1963] version of
Rule 58 provides a greater degree of certainty as to when a judgment
has been rendered and becomes effective. Thus, as previously pointed
out, when the courts decision, whether written or oral, is a simple
grant of a sum certain or cost or that all relief be denied, the clerk is to
prepare forthwith and sign a judgment which must be set forth on a
separate document. Thereafter, the clerk is immediately to enter the
judgment in the civil docket.
Id. at 221 (citing 6A J.MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 58.04 (4-2), at 58-161 (1972)).
72Id. at 219-20. The Court noted that "Rule 58 was substantially amended in 1963 to
remove uncertainties as to when a judgment is entered and to expedite the entry of
judgment by limiting the number of situations in which the court need rely on counsel for
the prevailing party to prepare a form of judgment." Id.
73 Id. at 220. The Court noted that the sentence within Rule 58 following the description of
simple and complex judgments states that "every judgment shall be set forth on a separate
document" and that "a judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered as
provided in Rule 79(a)." Id.
74Id. This reasoning was taken from the notes of the Advisory Committee to the 1963
amendment. Id.; see 28 US.C. app. at 784-85 (1994) (setting forth the notes of the Advisory
Committee).
7Indrelunas,411 US. at 220; see also WRIGHT, ET AL, supra note 47, at 9 (examining the
effects
of the 1963 amendments).
7
6 lndrehinas,411 U.S. at 221. The Court held that the document of February 25, 1971, was
the first document that would have met the requirements of Rule 58. Id. According to the
Court, the civil docket entry was merely a reflection of the district court's determination as
to the liability of the parties and, most importantly, was not recorded on a separate
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The Court additionally stated that the 1963 amendments to Rule 58
illustrated that the rule was to be "mechanically applied" to all cases in
order to avoid new uncertainties as to the date on which a judgment is
entered, rather than using a case-by-case tailoring method to decide
whether an appeal is timely.7
The Supreme Court took its most recent look at Rule 58 in Bankers
Trust Co. v. Mallis78 in 1978.7 The Court noted that the appellate court's
refusal to remand the case for a separate judgment order conflicted with
other appellate court decisions, which had concluded that separate
8
judgment orders are an absolute prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction.W
However, the Court agreed with this refusal and permitted the case to go
forward without remanding it for a separate judgment order, stating that
the "separate document" requirement of Rule 58 could not have been
intended to create such a categorical imperative that parties are not free
to waive it.81 The Court stated that certainty as to timeliness is not
advanced by holding that appellate jurisdiction does not exist absent a
separate judgment.82 The Court further declared that only delay would
result from requiring the appellate courts to dismiss appeals where a

document per Rule 58. Id. The Court stated that the Seventh Circuit appeared to be
motivated at least partly by a desire to punish the government for ignoring the district
court's requests for amended complaints. Id. Instead of replying to the district court's
requests, the government waited almost two years to request final judgments to be filed so
the government could appeal the holding in the case. Id.
7 Id.

- 435 US. 381 (1978) (per curiam).
79Id. Although the Court originally granted certiorari to decide if Mals was a purchaser of
securities, the Court first had to decide a question of federal appellate jurisdiction. Id. at
382. Mallis sued Bankers Trust Company under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to recover for alleged fraudulent statements. Id.
80 Id. at 382-83. The District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the
action on the ground that the fraud alleged had not occurred "inconnection with the
purchase or sale of a security," as required by §10(b). Id. "The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed, holding that respondents were 'purchasers [of securities] by virtue
of their acceptance of [a] pledge' of stock and that petitioner was 'a seller by virtue of its
release of [a] pledge.'" Id. (citations omitted). The appellate court stated that a thorough
search of the district court's records revealed nothing that could be considered a judgment
document but considered Mallis on its merits, regardless, because both parties and the
district court proceeded with the assumption that there was an "adjudication of dismissal."
Id.
81Id. at 383. The Court noted that the sole purpose of the 1963 addition of the "separate
document" requirement to Rule 58 was to clarify when the time for appeal begins to run.
Id.
82Id. at 385.
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separate judgment order had not been filed, yet both parties and the
district court had proceeded as if it had been.83
The Mallis Court then noted its ruling in Indrelunas, recognizing that

the five-year old decision required a "mechanical" application of Rule 58
to every case.84 The Court recognized that a mechanical application of
Rule 58 would still be necessary in cases where there was uncertainty as
to when an appeal could be brought.83 However, the Court stated that
the need for certainty as to the timeliness of an appeal should not
prevent parties from waiving the separate judgment requirement when
one has inadvertently not been entered.8 6

Upon dismissal, the district court would simply file and enter the separate judgment
from which a timely appeal could then be made, thus making the extra steps unnecessary
and impractical. Id. The Court also stated that strict compliance with the separate
judgment requirement would not aid in the appellate court's determination of whether the
decision of the district court was final. Id. Even if a separate judgment is filed, the
appellate court still must determine whether the district court intended the judgment to
represent the final decision in the case. Id.
54 Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 386 (1978) (per curiam).
85Id. The Court did note, however, that the first paragraph of Indrelunas could be read as
holding that the separate judgment must be fied in compliance with Rule 58 before a
decision is final for the purposes of 28 U.S.CS § 1291. Id. at 386 n.7. To the extent that the
decision in Mallis is inconsistent with the first paragraph of Indrelunas, the Court
disavowed the earlier text. Id.
86 Id. This waiver rule resolved an inter-circuit split concerning appellate jurisdiction.
Zachary, supra note 50, at 410. Until Mallis, some cirut courts had been dismissing
appeals if they found the judgment order to be a jurisdictional requirement and it was
lacking, while other circuits were allowing appeals even without a judgment order and
declaring that Rule 58 had been waived. Id. Although the Supreme Court agreed with the
latter courts, it also stressed that the finality of the order being appealed and the waiver of
the requirement had to be dear. Id. As it had done before in Indrelunas, the Court cited
83Id.

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE:

'[Tihere would appear to be no point in obliging the appellant to
must be
undergo the formality of obtaining a formal judgment.... [I]t
remembered that the rule is designed to simplify and make certain the
It is not designed as a trap for the
matter of appealability.
inexperienced.... The rule should be interpreted to prevent loss of the
right to appeal, not to facilitate loss.'
Mallis, 435 U.S. at 386. In addition, the Court stated that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are "construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." Id. at 386-87 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 US. 178 (1962)). In a separate
opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg observed that Rule 58 "must be applied in such a
way as to favor the right to appeal" Elijah Yip & Eric K Yamamoto, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsnurg's Jurisprudence of Process and Procedure, 20 U. HAW. L.REV. 647, 653 (1998) (citing
Ctr. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 781 F.2d
935 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Ginsburg went on to say that as long as "it is clear that the district
court has intended a final, appealable judgment, mechanical application of the separatejudgment rule should not be used to require the pointless formality of returning to the
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In Mallis, the Court used "commonsense interpretation" to conclude
that where the notice did not mislead or prejudice the appellee, the
parties could waive the separate judgment requirements of Rule 58.87
The Court then held that the district court clearly demonstrated its
intention that the order was the final decision in Mallis.88 The Court held
that the parties had deemed the separate judgment requirement of Rule
58 to be waived because the petitioner did not object to the taking of an
appeal in the absence of a final judgment order. 8 '
III. THE SUPREME COURT GIvErH AND THE SUPREME COURT TAKETH AWAY:
THE CONFUSION WITHIN THE CIRCUITS FOLLOWING INDRELUNAS AND
MALUS

In the short time this court has been in existence we have seen
a disproportionate number of cases which have contained
jurisdictional issues stemming from lack of finality of the
judgment.90
To properly investigate the current status of Rule 58 doctrine within
the circuits, it is necessary to evaluate the circuits individually and look
at the decisions within the circuits both before and after the Supreme
Court decided Mallis. Part A discusses the five different approaches
taken to Rule 58 by different circuits." Part B explores the necessity for

district court for ministerial entry of judgment; instead, the right to immediate appeal is
favored." Id.
7Mallis, 435 U.S. at 387. "Itis too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of
such mere technicalities." Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,183 (1962)).
u Id. The court came to this conclusion because a judgment of dismissal was recorded in
the clerk's docket Id.
89 Id. at 388. The Court went on to say that, although the appellate court did have
jurisdiction over the merits, the Supreme Court's decision did not reach the merits. ld.
Instead, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari because counsel brought up a new theory
for affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals that changed the posture of the case
between the time of the decision of the Court of Appeals and the time when the case was
presented to the Supreme Court. Id. The Court dismissed the action. Id. The Court stated
that there was proper appellate court jurisdiction under 28 US.C. § 1291. Id. Following
Mallis, courts have interpreted this waiver to only apply where: (1) the district courfs
opinion was dearly intended to be the final decision of that court; (2) the judgment has
been recorded in the docket; or (3) the appellee did not object to the taking of the appeal in
the absence of a Rule 58 document. See, e.g., Barber v. Whirlpool Corp., 34 F.3d 1268,127475 (4th Cir. 1994).
9 Merchant v. Nanyo Realty, Inc., No. CVA96-00, 1997 WL 1051628, at *3(Guam Dec. 31,
1997) (per curiam) (stating that Rule 58 should be expressly honored).
1 See infra Part II.A.
8
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uniformity throughout the federal courts.92 Part C investigates the
positive and negative aspects of a Rule 58 amendment that was proposed
in August 2000 by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.3
A. Lack of Rule 58 Uniformity Within the Circuits
The Supreme Court decided Mallis five years after Indrelunas,
reducing the urgency it had accorded Rule 58 without overturning
Indrelunas.94 The tension between the "mechanically applied" Indrelunas
decision, which requires a strict interpretation of Rule 58 in every claim,
and the waiver-friendly Mallis decision, which allows courts to waive the
requirements of Rule 58, has caused confusion and disparity among the
circuits. 95 It has also led to some creative solutions not yet mandated or
reviewed by the Supreme Court.9 The majority of the conflicts arise
from situations in which parties are considered to have waived their
right to object to an appeal, as well as how to manifest such an objection.
Additionally, much confusion exists over whether Mallis gave courts the
power to accept jurisdiction without remand in all cases or only in the
specific situation that faced the Mallis Court.
1. The First Circuit: Ingenuity is the Mother of Invention
In Fiore v. Washington County Community Mental Health CenterY the
First Circuit attempted to resolve discrepancies in the application of Rule
58 in the federal courts.9 A panel of the court stated that the lower

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
94See, e.g., Hanson v. Town of Flower Mound, 679 F.d 497,502 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that
Indrelunasis still good law despite the holding in Mallis).
5 See stipra notes 66-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holdings in
Indrelnasand Mallis).
Part III.A.1 (discussing the First Circuit's approach to Rule 58).
96See infra
97960 F.2d 229 (1st Cir.1992).
9I Id. at 231. Fiore brought an action alleging that the Washington County Community
Mental Health Center and its employees had treated his young daughter negligently by
erroneously teaching her that her father had engaged in "sexually inappropriate behavior"
toward her. Id. In March 1990, the district court granted sununay judgment for the
defendants. Id. Fiore filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment under Rule 60(b) and
for leave to file a third amended complaint. Id. On June 27,1990, the district court denied
the petition by stamping "Denied" above the judge's signature on a photocopy of Fiore's
Id. On July 17, Fiore filed a motion for reconsideration or, alternatively,
motion.
explanation of the court's reason for denying the 60(b) motion. Id. On September 21, the
district court, without discussion, denied the motion by making a margin notation Id. at
231-32 On October 22. Fiore sought entry of a final judgment on the June 27 denial of his
Rule 60(b) motion. Id. at 232 He argued that the decision was not final for purposes of
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courts should meticulously comply with Rule 58.99 After a rehearing en
banc, however, the full court determined that Rule 58 should be treated
with more flexibility.' 00 The panel's view prevailed and the Rule 58
separate document requirement was held to mechanically apply to all
appealable post-judgment orders in the First Circuit.1°
The court then stated that the sole purpose for the separate
document requirement was to establish a reference point for determining
the timeliness of post-judgment motions and appeals. 10 2 This made the
court feel even more strongly that the requirements of Rule 58 needed to
be followed in every claim to avoid uncertainties as to the date of
appeal. 03 To avoid ambiguity and uncertainty, the court considered it a
necessity to have a separate document originated by the court containing
only the judgment. 104
The First Circuit next looked to the Supreme Court's decisions for
guidance as to the degree of importance to be placed on Rule 58.10 The

appellate review because the denial had not been set forth on a separate document as
required by Rule 58. Id.
99d.
IWoId. at 232 The district court had issued a memorandum following Fiore's motion for
entry of a final judgment. Id. In the memorandum, the court stated that finality of the June
27 decision "is a matter for the First Circuit Court of Appeals to consider when and if Mr.
Fiore appeals that decisioa" Id.
101Id. at 231.

Id. at 233 (citing Alman v. Taunton Sportswear Mfg. Corp., 857 F.2d 840, 843 (1st Cir.
1988)). The court looked at the uncertainty that may occur when a Rule 58 separate
document is not filed, noting that the uncertainty may be less likely with post-judgment
orders than for original judgments. Id. at 234. The court considered the words of the
Advisory Committee from the 1963 amendment requiring the separate document. Id. The
Advisory Committee was particularly concerned about the occasions in which courts
issued opinions containing dispositive words and then signed formal judgment papers
later. id. With both documents, the Advisory Committee was concerned that the parties
would be unsure which document to follow when measuring the time in which to appeal
Id.
Im3Fiore v. Washington County Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 960 F.2d 229, 233 (1st Cir. 1992).
The court stated that Rule 58 was especially necessary in the context of Rule 60(b) motions,
as they neither affect the finality of the original judgment nor extend the time for appealing
the judgment. Id. Because the Rule 60(b) motion can be completely separate from the
original judgment, the necessity of a final separate judgment order document becomes all
the more necessary so that the parties know the specific dates in which they can appeal the
judgment. Id.
0
'1 Id. at 234-35. In Fiore, the district court clerk photocopied a motion, which the appellant
submitted to the court Id. at 234. At the top of the photocopy, the clerk typed the word
"Denied" and filed that as the separate judgment order. Id. Upon appeal, the appellate
court found that this did not satisfy Rule 58. Id.
105 Id. at 235.
102
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Fiore court stated that the "mechanically applied" doctrine of Indrelunas
had been relaxed in Mallis, but the court believed that the relaxation only
applied when there was a need to alleviate inconvenience or hardship
caused by the rule's "hypertechnicality."106 Despite this discussion,
however, the court held that there was no reason to remand to the
district court for the separate judgment to be entered. 107 The court found
that remanding could possibly result in long dormant cases being
reopened and exposing unwilling and unwary appellees to litigation that
they believed to be over.108
Instead, the First Circuit created its own system to determine the
timeliness of an appeal: if an appeal is brought within thirty days of the
filing of a Rule 58 separate judgment order document, the appeal is
timely. 109 If there was no separate document that met the strict

MId. The court stated that a standard rule, which assigned finality to a marginal denial of
a post-trial motion, could not serve the purpose of alleviating inconvenience, even if the
marginal denial was technically on a separate piece of paper, i.e., a photocopy of Fiore's
motion. Id. In addition, the court stated that a party could find itself in an awkward
position if, after filing a notice of appeal, the district court then issued an explanatory
memorandum of the marginal denial. Id.
107 Id. at 236-37. The court stated that, absent exceptional circumstances, it is appropriate

"to infer waiver where a party fails to act within three months of the court's last order in a
case." Id.
108 Id.The court noted:
When a party allows a case to become dormant for such a prolonged
period of time, it is reasonable to presume that it views the case as
over. A party wishing to pursue an appeal and awaiting the separate
document of judgment can, and should, within that period file a
motion for entry of judgment. This approach will guard against the
loss of review for those actually desiring a timely appeal while
preventing resurrection of litigation long treated as dead by the
parties.
Id.
109
Fiore v. Washington County Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 960 F.2d 229, 239 (1st Cr. 1992).
In Fiore,the First Circuit set forth its rules for entering judgment
1. Any order denying (as well as granting) post-judgment motions
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b) and (e), and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure must be set forth on a "separate document"
2 A "separate document" is a document originated by the court, not a
party, separate from any other paper filed in the case. A marginal note
on a copy of a motion, for example, will not suffice. Normally, under
Rule 58(1), clerks should draft the document for the judge's approval.
3. If a party appeals a judgment that complies with the requirements
of Rule 58 except that for a separate document
a. within a period that would make the appeal timely if
judgment had been entered on a "separate document," we will not
dismiss the appeal for lack of such a document but will deem the
appellant to have waived his right to it.
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requirements of Rule 58, however, then the parties would have ninety
days from the final action in the case in which to appeal, making Rule 58
no more than a procedural technicality which could be ignored.11 0 No
other circuit has followed this approach and the Supreme Court has yet
to review the ninety-day rule; therefore, it is only mandatory authority
within the First Circuit."'
2. The Second and D.C. Circuits:
2
Imperative""

Rule 58 is Not a "Categorical

The same year the Supreme Court decided Mallis, the Second Circuit
handed down a decision in Turner v. Air Transport Lodge 1894 of
International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.113 Turner
114
illustrated the effect that Mallis had on the circuit's appellate courts.

b. after the period in subparagraph (a) but within three
months of the final action in the case, as set forth in subparagraph (a),
we will deem appellant to have waived the right to a "separate
document." If, however, no appeal has been filed, the party will be
free to argue that judgment has not yet been "entered" as Rule 58
requires, and that the time to file an appeal therefore has not yet begun
to run. If, before appealing, the party files a motion to set forth the
judgment on a "separate document," the district court should do so.
c. more than three months after the last action in the case,
we shall, absent exceptional circumstances, deem the party to have
waived his right to a judgment entered on a separate documenL Such
an appeal therefore will be dismissed as untimely.
Id.
1
'1Id.
M See New Shows v. Don King Prods., Inc., Nos. 99-9019, 99-9069, 2000 WL 354214, at 5-6
(2d Cir. Apr. 6, 2000) (refusing to follow Fiore because the appellant's motion was timely
regardless of the approach); United States v. Haynes, 158 F.3d 1327,1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(refusing to follow Fiore because it would be fatal to the appeal); Hammack v. Baroid Corp.,
142 F.3d 266, 270 (5th Cir. 1998) (refusing to follow Fiore because it extinguishes claims to
promote certainty); Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 110 F.3d 1247,1253 & n.4 (6th Cir.
1997), vacated in part on othergrounds, 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998) (declining to follow Fiore
because the First Circuit system was not supported by Rule 58 or the Supreme Court's
comments).
112Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24,32 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing Bankers Trust Co. v.
Mallis, 435 US. 381, 384 (1978)) (holding an appeal was not premature even though the
district court had not filed a separate document judgment order pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 58).
113585 F.2d 1180 (2d Cir. 1978).
4
11
1d. at 1181. Recognizing the availability of the Mallis waiver, the court did not encourage
such a practice. Id. The court instead remanded the case to the district court for a more
complete explanation of the judgment with the stipulation that, after the more explicit
judgment was entered, the case would return to the appellate court promptly for a decision
on the appeal. Id. Turner was a member of defendant Air Transport Lodge 1894 which
was affiliated with another defendant International Association of Machinists and
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Although the appellate court remanded Turner for clarification from the
district court, it was swayed enough by Mallis to recognize that Rule 58
could now be waived in certain circumstances. 115
Two years later, in Leonhard v. United States,116 the Second Circuit
held that Rule 58 is meant only to pinpoint the commencement of time
for filing an appeal and that Mallis prohibited remanding cases unless

there was some uncertainty as to finality." 7 In Leonhard, the appellate

Aerospace Workers. Id. Turner was expelled from his union on January 28, 1976. Id. He
brought an action under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
asking for: (1) a permanent injunction against enforcing his expulsion; (2) a declaratory
judgment that his expulsion was void; (3) a permanent injunction against infringement by
defendants of his rights under LMRDA; (4) a declaratory judgment that Article L § 3 of the
constitution of the International union was void to the extent specified, and (5) for
attorney's fees. Id. After the defendant's answer, Turner moved for entry of judgment for
the relief demanded in the complaint. Id. The defendants in turn moved for summary
judgment Id. at 1182. On March 31, 1978, Judge Constantino filed his "memorandum and
order" from which the two lodges appealed. Id.
115Id. The appellate court stated that it had difficulty determining the decision of the
district court because the terms of the decision were not spelled out in the document and
there was no Rule 58 separate document judgment order. Id.
116
633 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1980).
117 Id. at 611 (accepting appellate jurisdiction despite the lack of a Rule 58 order).
Leonhard's ex-wife had remarried a man who had information about organized crime. Id.
at 605. The government agreed to hide Leonhard's ex-wife, her new husband, and
Leonhard's children if the man testified. Id. Leonhard was never consulted about the deal.
Id. After the testimony, Leonhard lost contact with his children. Id. In June 1971,
Leonhard was granted custody of the three children. Id. In July 1971, Leonhard brought an
action against officers of the Department of Justice, demanding that they disclose where his
children were located now that he had official custody over the children. Id. The district
court ruled that Leonhard had no constitutional right to custody of his children or even to
visitation rights, and that the officers were doing what was in the best interests of the
children. Id. As evidence of this, the defendants produced a "murder contract" that had
been placed on his ex-wife and the children. Id. On July 11, 1975, Leonhard was reunited
with his children. Id. On June 30, 1978, he filed the current suit on behalf of himself and
his children, seeking money damages for the violation of his and his children's
constitutional rights and for torts committed against the children as a result of the
separation from their father. Id. at 604. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that it failed to state a claim and that all claims asserted were barred by the
applicable statutes of limitations. Id. at 607. Eventually, the claims against all defendants
were dismissed, except those against Leonhard's ex-wife's new husband, who had never
been served and had never appeared. Id. at 608. The appellate court stated that normally
when a dismissal remains subject to revision until all the liability of all the defendants has
been determined, an immediate appeal is not available. Id. However, in a circumstance
where the only remaining defendant has never been served, the circumstances are
materially different. Id. In this case, the remaining defendant was not considered to be a
party for the purposes of the dismissal and there was no reason to leave the dismissal open
for revision. Id. Therefore, the court held that the absence of a non-served party was not
an impediment to Leonhard's present appeal. Id. at 609.
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court asked the district court to make corrections on its final order so
that it would meet Rule 58 requirements and the appellate court could
accept jurisdiction immediately." 8
The Second Circuit later dismissed all the requirements of Rule 58
and construed a trial court decision to comply with the requirements of
the separate document judgment order section of Rule 58.119
Additionally, as long as the appellee does not object, the Second Circuit
allows appellate courts to accept jurisdiction without remanding to the
district courts1 20 In New Shows v. Don King Productions,121 the Second

I's Id. at 612. The court also found that the absence of a Rule 58 separate document
judgment order from the district court was not an impediment to the appellate jurisdiction
Id. at 611. The court stated that although Rule 58 required a separate document order, this
requirement is intended "merely to pinpoint, principally for the benefit of the appellant,
the commencement of time for filing a notice of appeal." Id. The court found that certainty
as to the date of appeal would not be advanced by holding that appellate jurisdiction did
not exist without the Rule 58 document. Id. The court noted that Leonhard had not
objected to the appeal despite the lack of a judgment order from the court below. Id. at 612.
Although the defendant-appellees objected, they failed to show any respect in which they
were prejudiced by the taking of the appeal without a judgment order, so the court
dismissed their objections. Id.
119Great Am. Audio Corp. v. Metacom, Inc., 938 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1991). Although no
separate document judgment order was entered in Great American, the court construed the
decision to be a Rule 58 order, citing Mallis as authority for its decision. Id. at 18. Great
American had appealed from a district court decision denying its request for an injunction

against Metacom under the Lanham Act in connection with the marketing of a toy bus
containing audio cassettes. Id. at 17. Great American claimed that Metacom's toy bus was
confusingly similar to Great American's, including the facts that both buses were of a
similar size and both had openings in the top for four cassettes. Id. At the end of the
hearing, the district court denied Great American's request for injunctive relief. Id at 18.
The district court judge signed his decision, which was entered into the district court

docket. Id.
12DSeletti

v. Carey, 173 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1999). Seletti claimed to be the author of Mariah
Carey's hit song titled, "Hero." Id. at 106. He fied a complaint in early 1996 claiming
violations of the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act. Id. On May 21, 1997, the district

court ordered Seletti to pay $5000 for discovery abuses and to post a $50,000 bond as
security for defendant's costs and attorney's fees which are potentially recoverable under
the Copyright Act. Id. The sanctions were partially in response to Seletti's discussion of
the case during an appearance on an NBC television show and for inviting a reporter to a
pre-trial conference. Id. Seletti filed a notice of appeal that was dismissed by the clerk of
the appellate court for failure to submit the proper docketing fee. Id. On June 26,1997, the
district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice due to plaintiff's failure to pay the
sanction or post the bond ordered in May 1997. 1&. at 107. Seletti filed an appeal on
February 18, 1998. Id. at 108. The appellate court first considered whether it had
jurisdiction over the decisions of May 21,1997, and June 26,1997, because neither had been
accompanied by a Rule 58 judgment order. Id. at 109. The court held that appellate
jurisdiction existed over the June 26 decision despite the absence of a separate judgment
order. Id. The court reasoned that when an order dearly represents a court's final decision
and the appellees do not object to the taking of an appeal, the separate document judgment
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Circuit considered whether to follow the First Circuit's holding in Fiore.
After finding that every other circuit that had considered the Fiore
scheme had rejected it, the Second Circuit rejected it as well. 122
The D.C. Circuit followed the Mallis decision faithfully throughout
the 1980s, holding that Rule 58 is only meant to determine the time of the
appeal, not to deny appellate jurisdiction. 123 Additionally, the D.C.
Circuit has held that Rule 58 must be read to favor appeals.124 Most

rule is deemed to have been waived and the assumption of appellate jurisdiction is proper.
Id.
at 109-10.
12
Nos. 99-9019,99-9069, 2000 WL 354214, at *5-6 (2d Cir. Apr. 6,2000).
I id. (citing United States v. Haynes, 158 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Hammack v.
Baroid Corp., 142 F.3d 266, 270 (5th Cir. 1998); Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 110
F.3d 1247, 1253 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated in part on other grounds, 143 F.3d 263 (6th Or.
1998)).
123 See, e.g., Diamond v. McKenzie, 770 F.2d 225, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
Diamond, a severely learning disabled and emotionally disturbed teenager, and his mother
filed a complaint charging that the District of Columbia Board of Education and various
District of Columbia officials had violated Diamond's rights under several federal statutes
and the United States Constitution. Id. at 226. Defendants moved to dismiss or, in the
alternative, moved for summary judgment. Id. On December 21, 1984, the district court
filed an order that accomplished several things: (1) it dismissed all claims under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Fifth Amendment; (2) it
dismissed the District of Columbia Board of Education as a party; and (3) it ordered
defendants to place Diamond at a residential placement in Florida and for the District of
Columbia Public Schools to pay for the placement and to reimburse Diamond's mother for
any previous tuition payments. Id. at 227. In addition, the order stated that a
memorandum would follow with reasons for the decision, but it also purported to be "the
final order of the Court." Id. On January 7, 1985, defendants moved for relief from the
order, requesting that they not be forced to pay for Diamond's move or tuition until the
memorandum was filed, as it was impossible for them to appeal until they knew the
reasons for the decision. Id. On January 23, 1985, the district court filed its memorandum
setting forth both findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. On January 31, 1985,
defendants filed their notice of appeal. Id. The appellate court issued an order to show
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it came more
than thirty days after the order from the district court. Id. However, citing to Rule 58, the
court stated that there was never a separate document judgment order fied along with the
December 21 decision. Id. at 228. The court looked specifically to Indrelunas,stating that an
appeal is not untimely if Rule 58 has not been satisfied by the district court Id.
Additionally, the court looked to Mallis for support that dismissing the appeal would not
be appropriate. Id. at 230. The court considered the combination of the order and the
memorandum to be proof that the district court had issued a final judgment in the case and
also considered the fact that the appellees did not effectively object to the taking of the
appeal. Id. Therefore, the court accepted jurisdiction. id.; see also id. at 231-35 (Robinson, J.,
concurring) (discussing the history of Rule 58 and the various amendments to the rule).
124See, e.g., Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that Rule
58 is not a "categorical imperative"). In Spann, the plaintiff-appellants sought to pursue
claims that real estate advertisements placed by defendant-appellants featuring white
models to the exclusion of black models violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Id. at 25-26.
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recently, the D.C. Circuit's 1997 decision in Pack v. Burns International
Security Service"25 asserted that appellate courts should exercise
jurisdiction over appeals where no Rule 58 order has been filed from the
district court below, even if the appellee objected to the appellate
jurisdiction. 126 The court held that jurisdiction was proper even over the
objections of the appellee after an examination of other circuit decisions

After two cases were consolidated in January 1987, the district court scheduled briefing on
dispositive motions. Id. at 26. The district court, in May 1987, ruled in favor of the
defendant by: (1) dismissing plaintiffs' pleas under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and (2) granting summary judgment
striking out the FHA claims as time-barred. Id. Plaintiffs planned to appeal, but their plans
were aborted when Colonial Village filed in the appellate court a motion to dismiss for
want of the requisite finality. Id. Colonial pointed out that the district court had not
addressed a co-defendant's objection as to service. Id. The appellate court dismissed the
appeal without prejudice for lack of a final order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b). Id. The district court then made efforts to finalize the judgment. Id. When another
notice of appeal was filed, a co-defendant challenged the appeal as premature. Id. at 31.
The appellate court stated that the appeal was not premature even though the district court
had not filed a separate document judgment order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 58. Id. After discussing the purpose of the Rule 58 separate document
requirement as seen through the 1963 amendments, the court held that Rule 58 is not a
"categorical imperative." Id. at 32 (citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 US. 381, 384
(1978)). The appellate court stated that nothing but delay would result from remanding
and that Rule 58 must be read "in such a way as to favor the right to appeal" Id. (citation
omitted).
M2130 F.3d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
12 Id. at 1072- Pack filed a pro se complaint after a September 1995 encounter at Union
Station with Amtrak guards and employees of the Bums International Security Service. Id.
at 1071. Bums in turn fied a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Id. Pack failed to fie a timely response to the motion
and the district court issued an order directing him to respond by a particular future date.
Id. Two weeks prior to the deadline, Pack filed an opposition to the dismissal motion. Id.
Apparently unaware of Pack's filing, the district court subsequently entered an order
stating that the motion to dismiss would be treated as conceded and granted. Id. at 107172. The district court's order provided several grounds for dismissal, and directed that the
case be "dismissed with prejudice from the docket of this court." Id. at 1072. No separate
judgment in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 was entered. Id. Fortyeight days later, Pack fied a notice of appeal. Id. Bums responded with a motion to
dismiss the appeal, arguing that the notice of appeal was untimely and that the district
court judge's notation of "Let this be filed" on the notice of appeal was ineffective to extend
Pack's appeal time in the absence of a motion requesting an extension. Id. The appellate
court first stated that Pack's notice of appeal could not be considered late because of the
"mechanically applied" rule of Indrelunas. Id. The court stated that "[an appellant may,
therefore, safely wait until a conforming judgment has been entered and file an appeal at
that time." Id. (citing Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993)). However, the appellate
court found the more difficult question to be whether the court had jurisdiction to hear
Pack's appeal because the appeal was technically "premature." Id.
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on whether cases should be remanded to district courts for appropriate
Rule 58 orders to be entered. 1'
3. The Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits: Why Go Back When You Can Go Forward?
[Presentlya] party safely may defer the appeal until Judgment
Day if that is how long it takes to enter the document.128
a. Conformity in Result Throughout the Seven Circuits
The Supreme Court's decision in Mallis has changed the way several
circuits approach appellate jurisdiction in cases where the district courts
have not properly filed Rule 58 separate document judgment orders. 12 '
Id. at 1072. Citing Mallis, the court stated that, in certain circumstances, parties could
waive Rule 58 requirements and an appellate court could exercise jurisdiction over an
appeal even though no judgment had been entered. Id. The court found very persuasive
the wording from Mallis- "Upon dismissal, the district court would simply file and enter
the separate judgment, from which a timely appeal would then be taken. Wheels would
spin for no practical purpose." Id. (citing Banker's Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 US. 381, 385
(1978)). The appellate court agreed with the other circuit courts, which had read Ma/i$ to
require an appellate court to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal from a nonconforming
judgment notwithstanding an appellant's failure to file a notice of appeal within the
applicable time period following entry of judgment. Id. at 1073. The appellate court
assumed jurisdiction over Pack's appeal despite Bums' protests. Id.
128 In re Kilgus, 811 F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that the more mechanical the
application of Rule 58, the better).
IN See, e.g., Sears v. Austin, 282 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1960) (providing an example of how
circuits treated appeals that did not come from Rule 58 orders before Mallis). In Sears, on
March 1, 1960, the trial court judge signed and entered "Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law." Id. at 341. The final words of the document were: "Let judgment be entered
accordingly." Id. The judge also signed a written judgment that was, on its face, final in
form. Id. On March 9, defendants filed a motion to amend the findings of fact and to set
aside the judgment and enter judgment for the defendants. Id. On March 30, defendants
filed a notice of appeal. Id. However, on April 1, the trial court judge entered an order
denying the defendants' motion. Id. The appellate court read this new order as replacing
the order of March 1. Id. The order of April 1 again concluded with "Let judgment be
entered accordingly," but judgment was never entered on the April 1 order. Id. The
appellate court held that there was something left for the trial court judge to do before the
case would be completed at that level and, therefore, dismissed the notice of appeal until
the trial court judge had entered a judgment order to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 58. ld.; see also Philtall Corp. v. United States, 546 F.2d 210,213-14 (5th Cir. 1976)
(stating that the 1963 amendment to Rule 58 had made it imperative that any document not
meeting the requirements of Rule 58 not be considered a final judgment); Dougherty v.
Harper's Magazine Co., 537 F.2d 758, 762 (3d Cir. 1976) (dismissing as premature an appeal
where the district court clerk had not entered a judgment as required by Rule 58, leaving
the appellate court without jurisdiction); Chicago Housing Tenants Org. v. Chicago
Housing Auth., 512 F.2d 19, 21 (7th Cir. 1975) (dismissing appeal because preliminary
injunction order was not sufficient to constitute a final judgment order pursuant to Rule
12
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In circumstances where these seven circuits previously remanded cases
that did not meet Rule 58's requirements, appellate jurisdiction is often
now accepted. 130 The courts cite various reasons and stipulations for
accepting appellate jurisdiction, but all cite to Mallis when allowing the
waiver of Rule 58's requirements. 131 Several of the circuits state that
appellate jurisdiction cannot be considered to be waived if the appellee
objects, but rarely do the courts act on this, and at least one circuit has
132
allowed an appeal over the objections of the appellee.

58); State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. United States, 488 F2d 890,892-93 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating
that appeal would be dismissed where trial court judge tacked judgment on the end of a
memorandum opinion instead of filing a separate document judgment order pursuant to
Rule 58); Levin v. Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc., 427 F.2d 847, 848-49 (3d Cir. 1970)
(dismissing as premature an appeal where the district court clerk had not entered a
judgment as required by Rule 58, leaving the appellate court without jurisdiction); Green v.
Reading Co., 180 F.2d 149,150 (3d Cir. 1950) (dismissing as premature an appeal where the
district court had not entered a Rule 58 judgment order, and a motion for judgment
remained to be acted on in the district court); McAlister v. C.J. Dick Towing Co., 175 F.2d
652, 654 (3d Cir. 1949) (dismissing as premature an appeal where the district court clerk
inadvertently neglected to enter a judgment on the verdict, leaving the appellate court
without jurisdiction). But see Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 294 F.2d 834, 837 (5th
Cir. 1%1) (holding that the final order of the district court can be construed as the
judgment order to satisfy Rule 58); Neely v. Merchants Trust Co. of Red Bank, N.J., 110
F.2d 525, 526 (3d Cir. 1940) (stating that a remand is not necessary just because the Rule 58
order
did not have a date on it).
130 See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am., Local
249 v. W. Pa. Motor Carriers Ass'n, 660 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1981) (accepting appellate
jurisdiction despite lack of Rule 58 judgment order); see also infra Part III.A.3.b (examining
changes in Rule 58 jurisdiction since the Mallis decision).
in See infra Part III.A.3.b (discussing decisions waiving Rule 58 because of the MaIlis test).
3
1 2 See Reynolds v. Golden Corral Corp., 213 F.3d 1344, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that a
remand to enter a Rule 58 judgment order would be a waste of judicial resources); Block v.
Allstate Ins. Co., No. 98-2034, 1999 WL 1267346, at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1999) (stating that
although the appeal would seem to be premature, the appellate court would consider the
appeal because neither party had objected to the appeal); Green v. Seymour, 59 F.3d 1073,
1076 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that appellant did not object to the lack of a Rule 58 order
and therefore waived the right to object); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 847 (9th Cir. 1995)
(stating that the lack of a Rule 58 order should not preclude the appellate court from
considering issues of Rules 15(a) or 60(b)); Barber v. Whirlpool Corp., 34 F.3d 1268,1274-75
(4th Cir. 1994) (waiving the Rule 58 separate document requirement where all three parts of
the Mallis test were met (1) the district court's opinion was clearly intended to be the final
decision of that court; (2) the judgment had been recorded in the docket; and (3) the
appellee did not object to the taking of the appeal in the absence of a Rule 58 document);
Blazak v. Ricketts, 971 F.2d 1408, 1410 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that appellate court has
jurisdiction where objecting party cannot show any prejudice by lack of Rule 58 order);
Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 182, 185 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that Rule 58's requirements do
not apply where there is no question as to the district court's intention of finality); United
States v. Hawaiian Art Corp., No. 90-16381, 1991 WL 260004, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 1991)
(stating that appellate court has jurisdiction where the objecting party cannot show any
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b. Distinctions Between the Seven Circuits
Before Mallis, the Third Circuit remanded or dismissed as premature
those claims that were not appeals from a Rule 58 order.133 However,

prejudice by lack of a Rule 58 order); Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1111 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that an appellate court can accept jurisdiction where the parties did not object to
the appeal on Rule 58 grounds); Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 166 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that parties had waived the separate document requirement because neither party
raised the question of noncompliance with Rule 58); Noli v. Conmm'r of Internal Revenue,
860 F.2d 1521, 1525 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that appellate court has jurisdiction where the
objecting party cannot show any prejudice by lack of a Rule 58 order); Lupo v. R. Rowland
& Co., 857 F.2d 482, 484 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding Rule 58 requirement waived where neither
party brought up the issue); Hall v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 906, 911 nt7 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that
the Rule 58 requirement was clearly waived when neither party objected to the appeal
being taken); Finn v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 821 F.2d 581, 585 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding
that appellate court can accept jurisdiction where the parties did not object to the appeal on
Rule 58 grounds); Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274,1276-77 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
appellate jurisdiction was acceptable where the government objected to an appeal due to
timeliness, but not due to lack of a Rule 58 order); Harris v. McCarthy, 790 F.2d 753, 756
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that Rule 58 requirements can be dismissed despite appellee's
asserted objections when appellee cannot show a claim of prejudice); French v. Merrill
Lynch, 784 F.2d 902, 905 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that Rule 58 requirements are not a
categorical imperative and may be waived); Composite Tech., Inc. v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London, Ltd. 762 F.2d 708, 709 n.3 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that Rule 58 can be
waived provided both parties agree to the waiver); Diaz v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 709
F.2d 1371, 1372 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that an appellate court can accept jurisdiction
where parties did not object to the appeal on Rule 58 grounds); Caperton v. Beatrice
Pocahontas Coal Co., 585 F.2d 683, 691 (4th Cir. 1978) (waiving the Rule 58 requirement
where defendants objected based only on untimeliness and not on the grounds that no Rule
58 order was entered by the district court). But see Nat'l Distribution Agency v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1997) (dismissing appeal because the
district court's documentation suggested that more rulings were forthcoming); Barber v.
Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 41 F.3d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the lack of a Rule 58
order left uncertainty as to intent of district court so that case had to be remanded to
district court for entry of a Rule 58 order); Ozark Rest. Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 761 F.2d
481, 484 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that it is better practice to remand the case to the district
court for entry of Rule 58 judgment order than to accept appeal, even when appellee
concedes that appellant has waived the Rule 58 requirement by filing the notice of appeal);
Gioia v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc. of Mo., 641 F.2d 540, 544 (8th Cir.1980) (holding that
appellant did not waive Rule 58 requirement because appellant ceased the action
voluntarily and did not consider it to be an order from the court).
133 See, e.g., Dougherty v. Harper's Magazine Co., 537 F.2d 758, 762 (3d Cir. 1976)
(remanding where the district court entered no Rule 58 order); Levin v. Wear-Ever
Aluminum, Inc., 427 F.2d 847,849 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding no appellate jurisdiction without a
Rule 58 order from the district court); Danzig v. Virgin Isle Hotel Inc., 278 F.2d 580, 582 (3d
Cir. 1960) (noting that an unambiguous Rule 58 order must be entered prior to an appeal to
prevent confusion); Green v. Reading Co., 180 F.2d 149,150 (3d Cir. 1950) (holding that a
Rule 58 order is necessary to appellate jurisdiction); McAlister v. C. & J. Dick Towing Co.,
175 F.2d 652, 654 (3d Cir. 1949) (stating that a rule 58 order is a "vital element" to an appeal
and cannot be ignored). But see Neely v. Merchants Trust Co., 110 F.2d 525, 526 (3d Cir.
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three years after Mallis, the Third Circuit experienced a reversal of
opinion in Rule 58 jurisprudence.'3 In 1981, the Third Circuit found that
Rule 58 was intended solely to avoid the inequities when a party appeals
from what appears to be a final judgment only to have the appellate
court announce that an earlier document was the judgment and then
dismiss the appeal.1 35 The court found that it would be a waste of time
to remand to the district court simply to have a new Rule 58 order

1940) (holding that clerk's erroneous omission of date on judgment order should not

mandate dismissal).
Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. W. Pa. Motor
Carriers Ass'n, 660 F.2d 76, 80 (3d Cir. 1981). Following Malis, the Teamsters court held
that Rule 58 should not be read to defeat the right to appeal Id.
ImId. Local 249 had been involved in a lengthy labor dispute with the Association over a
trucking industry practice known as "spotting." Id. at 78. "Spotting" was defined by the
court as a practice "whereby a carrier may instruct a driver to leave his trailer at a specified
location, and not to remain with it while it is being loaded or unloaded. Id. The driver may
then be assigned to other duties." Id. "Spotting" was prohibited in the jurisdiction of Local
249, but not in any other county in Western Pennsylvania. Id. The Association wished to
seek relief from the "spotting" restrictions within Local 249's county, Allegheny County.
Id. In May 1976, the Eastern Conference Joint Area Committee ("ECJAC"), a joint labormanagement committee, rendered a decision eliminating all restrictions on "spotting" in
Allegheny County. Id. On June 18, 1976, Local 249 initiated an action in federal court
against the Association seeking to set aside the decision of the committee Id. The district
court denied relief and dismissed the complaint on the basis that, because the committee
issued a decision as an arbitrator, the federal court had no jurisdiction to review the
decision. Id. The appellate court reversed, stating that ECJAC lacked jurisdiction over the
matter in the first place and vacated that committee's decision. Id. On October 16,1978, the
district court entered an injunction that had been agreed to by both parties. Id. at 78-79.
The Association moved for clarification of the injunction on November 26, 1979,
contending that the injunction prohibiting "spotting" had been intended only for
Allegheny County members, whereas Local 249 had interpreted the injunction to free all
members of the Association whether or not they maintained terminal operations within
Allegheny County. Id. at 79. The district court heard argument on January 11, 1980, but
denied the Association's motion that the court unequivocally state that the injunction was
only for Allegheny County. Id. Instead, the court agreed that the injunction prohibited
"spotting" by all members of the Association in Allegheny County whether or not they
maintained terminal operations there. Id. On motion from Local 249, the district court
issued a memorandum opinion on August 14, 1980, holding the Association in contempt
for failing to notify all its members of the terms of the injunction. Id. The court awarded
attorneys' fees to the local union to defray the cost of prosecuting the contempt
proceedings. Id. Additionally, the court denied the Association's motion to amend the
injunction. Id. When the Association appealed, Local 249 challenged the jurisdiction of the
appellate court on the basis that the August 14, 1980 memorandum opinion of the district
court did not constitute an appealable judgment conforming with Rules 58 and 79(a). Id.
Local 249 argued that the district court had postponed the entry of a final judgment until a
determination could be made regarding the amount of the attorneys' fee award. Id. at 7980.
134 Int'l
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filed. 136 The Third Circuit has attempted to be faithful to the decisions in
both Indrelunas and Mallis, making it difficult for appellants to predict
whether appellate courts will accept jurisdiction. 137

In 1978, mere months after the Supreme Court decided Mallis, the
Fourth Circuit analyzed how to proceed when no Rule 58 document had
been filed by the district court in Caperton v. BeatricePocahontas Coal Co.138
Although the court held that the time for appeal had not yet begun when
there was no Rule 58 document order and that appellate courts,
therefore, may not have had jurisdiction before Mallis, the Fourth Circuit
accepted jurisdiction in Caperton because of the three-part waiver test
from Mallis.139 The court found that when appellees do not object to the

appellate court assuming jurisdiction, they lose their right to contest the
waiver. 14 0 Since this decision in 1978, the Fourth Circuit has continued to
Id. at 80. Citing Mallis, the appellate court stated that the separate document
requirement should not be read so as to defeat the right to appeal. Id. Upon reviewing the
record, the appellate court was satisfied that the district court intended its August 14, 1980
order to serve as its judgment. Id. Therefore, the court held that "there would appear to be
no point in obliging appellant to undergo the formality of obtaining a formal judgment."
Id. (Citing 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACICE §110.08(2), at 120 nM7 (2d ed. 1970)).
137See, e.g., Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F3d 996, 1006 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994)
(waiving Rule 58 per Mallis where the district court erroneously neglected to enter a Rule
58 order); Kadelski v. Sullivan, 30 F.3d 399, 402 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a notice of
appeal filed ninety days after the district court's judgment order was timely because there
was no Rule 58 order to start the time for appeal); cf Williams v. Giant Eagle Markets, Inc.,
883 F.2d 1184, 1187 (3d Cir. 1989) (accepting jurisdiction after claim was remanded and
returned to appellate court following entry of Rule 58 order per Indrelunas); Gregson v.
Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 675 F.2d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 1982) (dismissing an appeal because
Indrelunasrequired a Rule 58 order prior to appellate jurisdiction).
138585 F.2d 683, 688 (4th Cir. 1978). A class of Virginia citizens brought an action against
two coal companies and their alleged owners, claiming to have been injured by seismic
tremors emanating from mining operations. IL at 685-86. On September 29, 1976, the
district court issued an "Opinion and Order" dismissing the cases for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, ruling that the coal companies had their principal places of business in
Virginia so there was no diversity. Id. at 686. On October 3, plaintiffs served defendants
with a "Petition for Relief From Mistake in Judgment," asking the court to amend the
earlier order to only dismiss the two coal companies and not their alleged owners. Id. The
district court judge denied the motion without comment. Id. On January 26, 1977, after
filing a request to extend the time for filing notices of appeal, appeals were filed as to the
question of jurisdiction. Id. After studying the documentation, the appellate court realized
that the September 29 order had never been properly entered into the docket Id. at 688.
Rather than filing a separate document pursuant to Rule 58, the district court judge had
merely tacked the order of dismissal onto the end of an opinion. Id. at 689. The appellate
court stated that this kind of procedure, no matter how explicit the order is, cannot satisfy
the requirements of Rule 58. Id.
13Id. at 690-91. The court determined that the three elements of a Mallis waiver were met.
Id. at 691; see also supra note 89 (listing the three elements of a Mallis waiver).
140
Caperton, 585 F.2d at 691.
136
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follow the three-part Mallis test and accept jurisdiction whenever all
three prongs are satisfied. 4 1
The Seventh Circuit embraced the Mallis decision immediately,
holding that Rule 58 was waived as long as all parties considered the
decision of the district court to be appealable. 42 The appellate court
found that Rule 58 did not preclude appellate jurisdiction and should be
read with common sense interpretation.143 The court claimed that
"parties are expected to know, or find out, jurisdictional
requirements," 144 yet the appellate court has accepted jurisdiction as long
as there is no proven prejudice to either party.14 The Seventh Circuit has
held not only that Rule 58 is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction, but also
that the wording of Rule 58 is not important and the district court orders
do not even need to follow the separate document requirement. 146 The

14 See, e.g., Block v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 98-2034, 1999 WL 1267346, at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 29,

1999) (stating that although the appeal would seem to be premature, the appellate court
would consider the appeal because neither party objected to the appeal being taken);
Barber v. Whirlpool Corp., 34 F.3d 1268, 1274-75 (4th Cir. 1994) (waiving the Rule 58
separate document requirement where the three-part Mallis test was met); Hughes v.
Halifax County Sch. Bd., 823 F.2d 832, 833-34 (4th Cir. 1987) (denying a Mallis waiver
one of the three elements was missing since the appeal was not timely).
where
42
1 See, e.g., United States General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050,1051 n.1 (7th Cir. 1979)
(stating that because all parties considered the order to be appealable, all parties were
considered to have waived their Rule 58 objections).
143See, e.g. Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v.
Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir. 1981). The appellate court accepted
jurisdiction notwithstanding the lack of a Rule 58 judgment order from the court below in
the absence of any prejudice to either party or any objection to the appeal. Id.
14 Rosser v. Chrysler Corp., 864 F.2d 1299, 1303 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Silberstein v.
Silberstein, 859 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1988)).
14 See TMF Tool Co. v. Muller, 913 F2d 1185, 1189 (7th Cr. 1990) (accepting appellate
jurisdiction where there was no question as to the district court's finality); Wikoff v.
Vanderveld, 897 F.2d 232, 237 (7th Cir. 1990) (waiving Rule 58 separate document
requirement when final disposition of district court was dearly intended to be the final
decision in the case); Frank Rosenberg, Inc. v. Tazewell County, 882 F.2d 1165,1166 n.1 (7th
Cir. 1989) (using the Mallis three-part test to explain appellate jurisdiction); Smith-Bey v.
Hosp. Adm'r, 841 F.2d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that district court's failure to enter
judgment on separate document will not defeat appellate jurisdiction as long as there is no
question as to the finality of the district court's decision); cf Smith v. Vill. of Maywood, 970
F.2d 397, 399-400 (7th Cir. 1992) (declining to use the Malis waiver when there was no
indication that appellee waived the Rule 58 requirements).
4 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Comptroller of the Currency of the United States,
956 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1992). First National Bank brought an action against the
Comptroller of the Currency to challenge the comptroller's refusal to allow the bank to
distribute individual properties owned by the fund to withdrawing investors in lieu of
either cashing them out or giving them proportional interest in the fund's entire portfolio
of properties. Id. at 1361. The district judge decided the case on the pleadings, but the
district court did not enter a separate judgment order because there was another count in
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only occasions where the Seventh Circuit has not waived the
requirements of Rule 58 are cases in which a waiver would defeat
appellate jurisdiction completely. 147 This has allowed the Seventh

the bank's complaint that was unresolved. Id. at 1362. Later, the parties agreed to drop
this unresolved count, but a judgment order was never entered. Id. The court cited to
Mallis for the proposal that an appellate court may take jurisdiction if a final judgment can
be discerned from the other documentation. Id. at 1363. Although the appellate court
discussed the importance of Rule 58, the court decided that a Rule 58 judgment order was
not necessary for the appellate court to have jurisdiction. Id.; see also Dickman v. Kramer,
980 F.2d 733, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that district court did not abuse discretion in
denying motion to reconsider when the court had decided that Rule 58 was satisfied in at
least three final and appealable orders and appellant complained about the lack of a final
judgment but never filed a motion to ask for one).
147See, e.g., Armstrong v. Ahitow, 36 F.3d 574, 575 (7th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Armstrong
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on December 1, 1992, seeking to challenge an
eighteen-year sentence imposed after he pled guilty to two counts of residential burglary.
Id. The court noted that habeas petitions are civil proceedings to which the rules of civil
procedure apply. Id. On March 23, 1993, the district court entered a memorandum opinion
and order denying his writ. Id. On May 2,1994, Armstrong filed a motion for appointment
of counsel and to take judicial notice that he was ineligible for post-conviction relief in
Illinois. Id. The district court responded with a minute order that denied Armstrong's
motions because the district court considered the case terminated in March of 1993. Id. On
May 23, 1994, Armstrong filed a document entitled "Late Notice of Appeal." Id. Because
the notice was filed over a year after the denial of Armstrong's petition, the appellate court
recommended that he attach a memorandum to his notice of appeal addressing the
timeliness of the appeal. Id. In addition, the appellate court noted that the district court
had not acted to extend the appeal period and that the appellate court lacked the power to
do this for Armstrong. Id. Instead of addressing the timeliness of the appeal to the
appellate court, Armstrong filed a motion before the district court requesting the length of
time for appeal be extended. Id. Amazingly, the district court granted his motion, despite
the requirement of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) that a motion to extend the
time for appeal in a civil case must be made within thirty days of the date the time for
appeal expires. Id. Instead of dismissing Armstrong's notice of appeal as untimely, the
appellate court remanded the case to the district court because it considered the appeal to
be premature. Id. The appellate court examined the district court's March 24, 1993
memorandum opinion and noted that it was not accompanied by a separate document
judgment order. Id. The court reasoned that because a Rule 58 judgment order had not
been entered, the time for appeal had not yet begun for Armstrong. Id. Even though the
appellate court recognized that the March 24 opinion was dearly meant to mark the end of
the case, the court stated that to waive the separate document judgment order would be to
defeat appellate jurisdiction. Id. Despite the fact that the appeal was filed fourteen months
after what the district court believed to be the end of the case and, therefore, thirteen
months after the filing date of Appellate Rule 4, the appellate court still did not terminate
Armstrong's right to appeal. Id. The court dismissed the appeal until the district court
entered a Rule 58 judgment order document, from which time Armstrong would have yet
another thirty days in which to file his notice of appeal Id. The court stated that if it were
to allow a Mallis waiver, the appeal would have been untimely and the right to appeal
would have been lost. Id. In dicta, the court recognized that district courts have only
limited time to devote to each of their cases, but the court strongly suggested that the
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Circuit to accept appeals months and even years after the final decision
of the district court, provided there was no Rule 58 order filed
correctly. 148 However, the Seventh Circuit has not allowed an appeal to
go forward when the appellee did not agree to waive the right to object
to jurisdiction. 149
The Eighth Circuit has stressed that the Mallis waiver needs to be
used with discretion because it is not always appropriate. 15 The court
refused to use a Mallis waiver in Gioia v. Blue Cross Hospital Service, Inc. of
Missouri,'5 ' holding that the appellee had not expressly waived the right
to object.'5 ' When the appellees have not given up the right to object, the
appellate court has dismissed appeals even though appellants may have
actually had claims worth considering.5 s The Eighth Circuit has
continued to use the Mallis waiver only when the appellee has expressly
waived the right to object and when the district court filed the court
district courts and their clerks needed to file separate document judgment orders more
faithfully in order to avoid judicial entanglements like this one. Id.
148 See, e.g., Otis v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1994). The Otis court
allowed an appeal over two years after the district court filed a dismissal with leave to
reinstate; the court deemed the district court's order to be "final." Id. at 1165. Because the
district court never followed up on the conditional dismissal, there was never a Rule 58
judgment order entered. Id. at 1162 The appellate court accepted jurisdiction in the case.
Id. at 1169.
49 Reich v. ABC/York-Estes Corp., 64 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1995). Reich, the Secretary of
Labor, brought a suit against the owners of an entertainment establishment featuring
female exotic dancers. Id. at 317. The suit alleged that the owners continuously violated
the Fair Labor Standards Act by not following guidelines for minimum wage, overtime,
and recordkeeping. Id. When the owners did not appear in court, the district judge
granted Reich a default judgment Id.at 318. This default judgment was rescinded when
the owners appeared later and promised to comply with all outstanding obligations and
discovery requests. Id. These promises were not kept, and Reich moved for sanctions and
another default judgment Id. The magistrate judge recommended that Reich's motion be
granted. Id. At the appeal stage, the owners moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as
the district court had never entered a separate document setting forth the judgment
enjoining the owners from future violations. Id. at 319. The court stated that, without a
Rule 58 judgment order, the appellate court can have jurisdiction only where neither party
is prejudiced nor objects to the appeal. Id. Therefore, the court could not accept
jurisdiction. Id.
58
MSanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161,167 (8th Cir. 1988). Although the appellate court
allowed the waiver in Sanders, the court stressed that the waiver should not be used as a
matter of routine. Id.
15641 F.2d 540 (8th Cir. 1981).
152 Id. at 544 (stating that the sole purpose of the separate document requirement was to
clarify the date when the time for appeal began to run). The appellate court statedi "While
it is with reluctance that we affirm the judgment of dismissal, since there may have been
some merit in plaintiffs claims which they will now be foreclosed from pursuing that
result is clearly in accord with previous decisions in this Circuit" Id.
153 1d. (citing Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 299 F.2d 480,485 (8th Cir. 1962)).
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order on the docket.15 4 The Eighth Circuit has also stressed that the
prevailing attorney at the district court level needs to ensure that Rule 58
is followed correctly in order to avoid any conflict at the appellate
level.15s
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's requirement for an express waiver of
Rule 58 in order to use a Mallis waiver, the Ninth Circuit's post-Mallis
decisions have held that Rule 58 can be waived even over the objections
of the appellee. 15 6 In the 1986 decision of Harrisv. McCarthy,5 7 the court

15See,e.g., Lupo v. R. Rowland & Co., 857 F.2d 482, 484 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that the Rule
58 requirement was clearly waived as neither party objected to the appeal being taken);
Hall v. Bowen, 830 F2d 906, 911 n.7 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding the separate document
requirement dearly waived because neither party raised the question of noncompliance
with Rule 58, an entry of the district court's order was recorded in the clerk's docket, and
the record indicated that the district court intended the memorandum opinion and order to
be its final decision). But see Ozark Rest. Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 761 F.2d 481,484 (8th Cir.
1985) (holding that it is better practice to remand the case to the district court for entry of a
Rule 58 separate document judgment order than to accept an appeal even when appellee
contends that appellant has waived the Rule 58 requirement by filing the notice of appeal).
'5mSanders, 862 F.2d at 168 (stating that attorneys all too often ignore the requirements of
Rule 58). In Sanders, the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted
summary judgment to defendants in a products liability action and denied plaintiffs
motion to reconsider and set aside the judgment. Id.
at 164. Sanders filed an appeal within
thirty days after the district court denied his motion for reconsideration, but more than
thirty days after entry of the order for summary judgment Id. Therefore, the appellate
court held that Sanders could only appeal the denial of his motion for reconsideration. Id.
The appellate court briefly considered whether Sanders should be allowed to appeal the
motion for summary judgment as well because it was not followed by a Rule 58 judgment
order. Id. at 167. Although acknowledging that the appeal seemed premature "at first
blush," the appellate court determined that Sanders had waived the separate document
requirement. Id. The court recognized four reasons to consider the requirement to be
waived: (1) neither party had raised the question of noncompliance with Rule 58; (2) in his
pleading, Sanders had referred to the district court's action as a granting of summary
judgment; (3) the trial court considered but rejected the motion to set aside the summary
judgment, apparently considering the summary judgment to be a final action; and (4) in an
earlier appeal, Sanders did not raise the Rule 58 issue and the appellate court entertained
the appeal despite the lack of a separate document. Id. at 166-67.
136 See Harris v. McCarthy, 790 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1986). The court specifically stated
that "[w]here 'nothing but delay would flow' from requiring the district court to enter a
judgment 'from which a timely appeal would then be taken,' ...the court should exercise
its discretion to hear the appeal" Id. at 756-57 (quoting Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435
U.S. 381, 385 (1978)); see also French v. Merrill Lynch, 784 F.2d 902 905 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986)
(allowing an appeal where neither party objected to lack of separate judgment); Taylor
Rental Corp. v. Oakley, 764 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that appellants stipulated
that no formal order denying post-trial motions needed to be issued, thereby waiving the
separate document requirement); cf.Herschensohn v. Hoffman, 593 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that although Rule 58 had been weakened by the holding in Mallis, it must
still be viewed as having a bearing on the intent of the trial judge and, thus, the trial court

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 3 [2002], Art. 7

808

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36

held that, although the appellee was actively asserting his rights under
Rule 58, the court could still waive the rule as long as there was no
prejudice to the appellee.' 5 Because the appellee did not claim in the
objection that there would be prejudice in waiving Rule 58, the court
held that the rule could be waived, the appellate court had jurisdiction,
and the appeal did not need to be dismissed.'5 9 In subsequent cases, the
court held that Rule 58 is not a necessary prerequisite to jurisdiction,
remanding a case to the district court is not necessary, and Rule 58 is not
a categorical imperative that needs to be followed every time it arises.160

judge was not finished with the case if he had not filed a separate document judgment
order).
157

Harris, 790 F.2d at 753.

158 Id.

at 756. Plaintiffs filed their action in district court on December 22 1981, seeking
injunctive and monetary relief for violations of their civil rights. Id. at 755. On December
21,1982, the district court issued a preliminary injunction, stating that the plaintiffs had not
shown compelling evidence but had shown they had a fair chance at success. Id. On July
2, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the case to enable them to pursue a single
trial of all the issues in state court. Id. The district court granted the motion and dissolved
the preliminary injunction. Id. On October 1, 1984, plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's
fees that the district court partially awarded on May 24, 1985. Id. However, the court did
not grant all the plaintiffs" requested attorney's fees as the court found unripe the plaintiffs'
claim that their lawsuit had prompted changes in the defendant's behavior. Id. at 755-56.
Plaintiffs timely filed their notice of appeal. Id. at 756. The defendants argued that the
appeal had to be dismissed because the district court's order did not conform to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 58's requirement for a separate document judgment order. Id. The
court cited Mallis and stated that Rule 58's sole purpose was to clarify when the time of
appeal begins to run. Id. In Harris, however, the court grappled with whether formal
compliance with Rule 58 is necessary when the appellee asserts, rather than waives, the
separate
judgment requirement. Id.
9
15
Id. at 756. After considering a Ninth Circuit case where an appeal was entertained over
the objection of the appellee and a Fifth Circuit case where the appeal was dismissed
because of the objection of the appellee, the appellate court in Harrisruled that the appeal
should be heard rather than causing unnecessary delay by remanding the case for a final
judgment. Id. at 756-57. The court commented that the appellees did not show that they
would be unfairly prejudiced due to the failure of the trial court to enter a Rule 58 final
judgment, leaving open the possibility in future cases for the appellee to show prejudice
and have the appeal dismissed. Id.
160 See, e.g., Hollywood v. City of Santa Maria, 886 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1989). On March 19,
1984, Marian Hollywood filed a sex discrimination and retaliation action against the City of
Santa Maria and other defendants in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California. Id. at 1229. Hollywood initially prevailed at trial on her retaliation claim, but
the district court ordered the matter to be retried. Id. The court found for the defendants
and judgment was entered against Hollywood on June 29, 1987. Id. The record showed
that the judgment was properly entered as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
Id. at 1229 n.1. On July 9,1987, Hollywood timely served and filed a motion for a new trial
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Id. at 1230. The district court denied this motion
from the bench on September 28,1987. Id. After denial, Hollywood fied her first notice of
appeal on October 5, 1987. Id. On March 2 1988, the district court filed a written order
denying appellant's motion for a new trial. Id. The order was nine pages in length,
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The Ninth Circuit has maintained that, in order to assert Rule 58 as an
161
objection to an appeal, there must be actual prejudice to the appellee.

explained the legal and factual basis for the court's decision, and was signed by the district
court judge. Id. The order concluded with the statement, "THEREFORE, Plaintiffs motion
for a new trial is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED." Id. Hollywood did not file a new notice
of appeal within thirty days of this order and instead fied a second notice of appeal on
March 22 1989. Id. The court dismissed the first notice of appeal because it was premature
and rendered ineffective by the order that was filed by the district court on March 2, 1988.
Id. Additionally, the court found that Hollywood should have filed her second notice of
appeal within thirty days of the order. Id. The court examined the order that had been
entered by the district court to see if it complied with the separate document judgment
order requirement. Id. The appellees argued that Hollywood's notice of appeal was
untimely because it was not filed within thirty days, to which Hollywood responded that
the time for appeal had not been triggered because the district court's judgment order did
not meet the necessary requirements. Id. Hollywood argued that, in addition to the nine
page opinion, the court needed to file a single page judgment order. Id. at 1231. The court
examined the nine page order and declared that it "definitively signaled the end of the
litigation." Id. at 1232. The court noted that the nine page order was entered on the docket
as an order denying the motion in compliance with Rule 79(a) and it was properly served
on the parties in compliance with Rule 77(d). Id. The court held that as long as counsel
was put on notice of the new order, the separate document judgment order requirement
was satisfied. Id. Therefore, the court found that all of the requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were met and dismissed Hollywood's appeal as untimely. Id.; see
also Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that a properly
entered separate judgment was not a necessary prerequisite for appellate jurisdiction and
therefore it was pointless to remand to the district court); French, 784 F.2d at 905 n.2
(allowing an appeal where neither party objected to lack of a separate judgment).
161See generally Bonin v. Calderon 59 F.3d 815, 847 (9th Cir. 1995). Bonin, a prisoner at San
Quentin State Prison, appealed the district court's denial of two petitions for writ of habeas
corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id. at 821. Between 1979 and 1980, Bonin committed a
string of brutal murders in Southern California. Id. In general, Bonin would pick up boys
between the ages of twelve and nineteen years. Id. After engaging in various sexual acts
with the boys, he would murder them, usually by strangulation. Id. Then he would dump
their nude bodies along the Southern California freeways. Id. Bonin was charged with
fourteen counts of murder as well as various other crimes, including robbery, sodomy, and
mayhem. Id. The jury acquitted Bonin of two of the murder charges as well as one sodomy
charge and one mayhem charge, but found him guilty of the remaining charges. Id. at 822.
Bonin was then sentenced to death for each of the murder convictions. Id. On automatic
appeal, the convictions and death sentences were affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied
Bonin's petitions for writ of certiorari with respect to each case. Id. Bonin filed two habeas
corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which were both denied by a district court judge.
Id. Bonin challenged the district court's denial of a petition to amend an earlier petition. Id.
at 847. Bonin contended that the judgment in this matter was never entered pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Id. The appellate court held that Rule 58's technical
separate judgment requirement is not jurisdictional and can be waived. Id. The court
stated that, absent any proof that Bonin had been prejudiced in any way by the district
court's failure to enter judgment on a separate document, the appellate court would
exercise jurisdiction. ld.; see also United States v. Hawaiian Art Corp., No. 90-16381, 1991
WL 260004, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 1991) (stating that Rule 58 is not a categorical imperative
and the parties can waive the requirement provided neither party is prejudiced by the lack
of a separate document).
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However, in the most recent cases in the Ninth Circuit, the court has held
that the time for appeal never began to run when the district court did
not enter a separate judgment and has again started remanding
162
appeals.
Until recently, the Tenth Circuit used Mallis waivers without
hesitation, but in cases where there was uncertainty of judicial finality,

the court remanded cases to either: (1) have the case settled, or (2) have a
Rule 58 separate judgment order document entered. 163 However, within
the last five years the Tenth Circuit has stated that even where there is
uncertainty, the appellate court can assert jurisdiction because Rule 58 is
not jurisdictional. 164 This has left the circuit in a state of uncertainty and,

162 See United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443,449 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
summary judgment order could not have been final because no separate document was
entered); Corrigan v. Bargala, 140 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the time for
appeal did not begin to run when the clerk failed to enter a separate judgment as required
by Rule 58); McCalden v. Cal. Library Ass'n, 955 F.2d 1214,1218-19 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating
that appellant's time for appeal never began to run because the district court never entered
a separate judgment); United States v. Carter, 906 F.2d 1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating
that the appellate court had jurisdiction where the district court never entered a separate
judgment).
163See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Huddlesto, 94 F.3d 1413, 1416 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996)
(encouraging all district courts to properly enter Rule 58 documents, but accepting
jurisdiction, regardless, because the court saw no question of the district court's finality);
Crislip v. Shanks, No. 94-2221, 1996 WL 156757, at *1-2 (10th Cir. Apr. 4, 1996) (holding
appeal was timely despite the absence of a Rule 58 judgment order from the district court);
Green v. Seymour, 59 F.3d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that Rule 58's requirements
did not apply when there was no question as to the district court's finality and appellee
had not objected to the lack of a Rule 58 document); Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 182,185 (10th
Cir. 1992) (holding that Rule 58's requirements did not apply when there was no question
as to the district court's intention of finality).
164Ladd v. McKune, No. 95-3264 (D.C. No. 95-CV-3181), 1997 WL 153775, at *3 (lOth Cir.
Apr. 3,1997). On April 25,1985, Ladd, an inmate in a correctional facility in Kansas, filed a
civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants: (1) transferred
him in retaliation for his previous legal actions against defendants; (2) interfered with his
access to court by depriving him of legal materials; and (3) denied him due process in the
prisoner grievance procedures. Id. at "1. The district court entered a memorandum and
order stating that Ladd's case was going to be dismissed as frivolous but granted Ladd an
extension until August 30,1995, to show cause why his complaint should not be dismissed.
Id. On August 21, Ladd filed a notice of appeal purporting to appeal the district court's
memorandum and order. Id. Three days later, the district court denied Ladd's motion for

leave to proceed in fonna pauperis on appeal. Id. The appellate court subsequently granted
this motion. Id. The court first considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear Ladd's
appeal. Id. The appellate court stated that the district court's memorandum and order was
not a final decision of the court when it was entered. Id. at *2. However, the court
determined that the memorandum and order had matured into a final decision on August
30 when Ladd failed to cure the deficiencies in his original complaint. Id. Therefore, the
court found that it had jurisdiction to hear Ladd's appeal. id. The court next turned to the
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until the appellate court hands down a decision that states the purpose
of Rule 58 within the Tenth Circuit, it currently has no place at all.16s
The Eleventh Circuit has been using the Mallis waiver in almost all
situations since the Supreme Court handed down its decision. 16 As long
as the parties involved did not expressly object to the appellate court

accepting jurisdiction, the case was not remanded to the district court,
and it proceeded. 167 The Eleventh Circuit has viewed Rule 58 as a rule

question of whether the lack of a Rule 58 judgment order would stop the appeal process.
Id. The appellate court found that the Rule 58 separate document requirement was not a
restriction on appellate process and that no separate document must be filed for the
appellate court to accept jurisdiction. Id. The court found that Rule 58 "only applies when
'there is uncertainty about whether a final judgment has [been] entered." Id. at *3(citing
Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995)). Additionally, the court
noted that Rule 58 does not apply where "there is no question about the finality of the
court's decision." Id. (quoting Slade v. United States Postal Serv., 952 F.2d 357, 359 n.1
(10th Cir. 1991)). Finally, the court stated that nothing but delay would result from
remanding the case to the district court for a final judgment order. Id.
1(d
Hassan v. Allen, No. 97-4005,1998 WL 339996, at *4 (10th Cir. June 24,1998). The Hassan
court recognized that past cases that had stressed the importance of district courts
following Rule 58. Id. (citing Amoco Oil Co.v.Jim Heilig Oil & Gas, Inc., 479 U.S. 966,969
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); United States v. City of
Kansas City, 761 F.2d 605, 606-07 (10th Cir. 1985)). However, the court also recognized the
recent cases in which the mechanical application of Rule 58 had been overlooked. Id.
(citing Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 18Z 185 (10th Cir. 1992); Kline v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 927 F.2d 522, 523-24 (10th Cir. 1991)). The Hassan court recognized the
tension between these two lines of cases. Id. The court refused to follow the holdings in
Clough and Kline because doing so would deny the appellants the opportunity for review
on the merits. Id. (citing Crislip v. Shanks, No. 94-2221, 1996 WL 156757 (10th Cr. Apr. 4,
1996)). Therefore, the court interpreted the district court's last order to be a final judgment
and established appellate jurisdiction through that document. Id. at *5; see also Trotter v.
Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 219 F.3d 1179, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that the last
action of the district court could not be considered a final judgment if there was some
uncertainty as to whether the appellant could have filed a motion to amend the complaint);
Freymiller v. CMS Transp. Serv., Inc., No. 98-6190,1998 WL 769846, at "1 (10th Cir. OcL 29,
1998) (stating that nothing but delay would result from remanding a case where no
question exists as to the finality of the district court's order notwithstanding a lack of a
Rule 58 judgment order).
6
'1 See Finn v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 821 F.2d 581, 585 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
appellate court could have jurisdiction where parties did not object to the appeal on Rule
58 grounds); Diaz v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 709 F.2d 1371, 1372 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983)
(stating that although the district court clerk failed to enter the final judgment as required
by Rule 58, because the parties had not objected, but rather had treated the order as the
entry of final judgment, the parties had waived the right to object).
167See, e.g., Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108,1111 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that the appellate court
could have jurisdiction where parties did not object to the appeal).
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that merely creates a definition of entry of judgment to dean up
confusion. 168
4. The Fifth Circuit You Cannot Have a Part Two Until Your Part One
is Finished
Before the Supreme Court's decisions in Indrelunas and Mallis, the
Fifth Circuit strictly followed the 1963 amendment to Rule 58, dismissing
appeals for lack of jurisdiction. 169 However, following Mallis, the court
accepted jurisdiction without a Rule 58 document as long as the district
court considered the judgment to be final and the parties did not
object.170 The Fifth Circuit held that, in previous cases, the circuit had
taken the Indrelunas "mechanically applied" test too literally and that
Mallis undermined the circuit's previous interpretation of Indrelunas.l n
However, the court still found that although Mallis granted the power to
accept jurisdiction without a Rule 58 order, Mallis did not require an
appellate court to do so.172 The court noted that Indrelunas was still good
law, but the court was no longer restrained by its narrow parameters.173

166See, e.g., Reynolds v. Golden Corral Corp., 213 F.3d 1344,1346 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating
that a remand to enter a Rule 58 judgment order would be a waste of judicial resources).
6
9 See Philhall Corp. v. United States, 546 F.2d 210, 213-14 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that the
1963 amendment to Rule 58 had made it imperative that any document not meeting the
requirements of Rule 58 not be considered a final judgment); State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v.
United States, 488 F.2d 890,892-93 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that appeal would be dismissed
when the trial court judge merely tacked judgment on the end of a memorandum opinion
instead of filing a separate document judgment order pursuant to Rule 58).
170 See, e.g., Escamilla v. Santos, 591 F.2d 1086, 1087 (5th Cr. 1979) (holding that a
memorandum opinion is "considered a final judgment despite the district court's failure to
follow the separate document requirement of Rule 58 if the district court intended the
memorandum opinion to represent a final judgment and the parties treated it as such").
171Hanson v. Town of Flower Mound, 679 F.2d 497, 500 (5th Cr. 1982). In Hanson, the
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, sua sponte, dismissed a pro se action for
damages for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 499. The district court did not, however, file a Rule
58 judgment order. Id.
172 Id. at 500. The appellate court examined the Indrelunas requirement of "mechanical
application" of Rule 58 in all cases and found that the Fifth Circuit may have been applying
the requirement too literally. Id. This interpretation of Indrelunas was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Mattis, prompting the appellate court to reexamine its position on the
necessity of a Rule 58 judgment order. Id. The appellate court found that although Malis
permitted the appellate court to accept jurisdiction, it did not require the court to do so. hi
Therefore, the question remained whether the Fifth Circuit should adhere to its previous
policy under Indrelunasor whether the Fifth Circuit should be swayed by Mals to accept a
more waiver-friendly policy. Id.
173 Id. at 502. The appellate court stated that it was the firm rule of the Fifth Circuit that a
panel could not disregard precedent absent an "overriding" Supreme Court decision. Id. at
500-01 (citing Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1354 n.10 (5th Cir. 1981)). The court
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The Fifth Circuit exercised this right to choose whether to accept
jurisdiction in Seal v. Pipeline, Inc.174 The Seal court held that an appeal
must be dismissed when the appellee objects to the jurisdiction. 175
Although Mallis had granted the appellate court the power to accept
without a Rule 58 order, the court dismissed the appeal as untimely and
held that the appeal could return to the appellate court if a proper Rule
58 document was filed in the district court. 176
The Fifth Circuit did not follow Rule 58 strictly, yet it was not ready
to consider Rule 58 to be a purely jurisdictional rule either.17
In

found no post-Mallis decision from the Fifth Circuit stating that Mallis was "overriding."
Id. at 501. However, the court then found that Mallis was an "overriding" change in the
law and, therefore, Mallis granted an appellate court the ability to accept jurisdiction even
though no separate judgment has been entered where the parties fail to raise the issue. Id.
The court then stressed three points: (1) Indrehnas is still good law; (2) the decision did not
change the law "when the appellee does object to the failure to enter the judgment as a
separate document"; and (3) it remains "better practice to have the judgment entered as a
separate document." Id. at 502.
174
724 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1984).
7 Id. at 1167. Benton Seal was injured while working as a seaman and brought suit under
general maritime law. Id. Before and after his suit was filed, Seal retained three different
attorneys. Id. Each retainer agreement provided for a contingency fee of 40%. Id. His
third attorney ultimately negotiated a $225,000 compromise settlement. Id. Seal died
before the attorneys' fees issue could be resolved. Id. The attorneys were unable to agree
on a division of fees. Id. Upon referral to a magistrate, the magistrate recommended a
division of fees, and the district court issued an order approving the magistrate's findings.
Id. However, the order was not followed by a judgment order as required by Rule 58. Id.
One of the three attorneys appealed the decision and another challenged the jurisdiction of
the appellate court because the requirements of Rule 58 were not met. Id. Because there
was no separate judgment and one of the appellees objected, the appellate court dismissed
the appeal. Id.
176
Id. (citing Taylor v. Sterrett, 527 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1976)).
"77See, e.g., Seiscom Delta, Inc. v. Two Westlake Park, 857 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1988). The
Seiscoin court examined how Mallis had refined Indrelunas. Id. at 281. The court cited the
three parts of the Mallis waiver test. Id. at 282. However, the document in front of the
appellate court did not meet the third prong of the Mallis test because Seiscom objected to
the appeal by moving for entry of a separate final judgment in conformance with Rule 58.
Id. The Seiscmn court stated that it was not necessary to hold that the Supreme Court had
set these three factors, all of which must be present for waiver of the separate judgment
requirement. Id. at 283. However, the court stated that the party that would have been
prejudiced must be shown to have acquiesced to the appeal in order for the appellate court
to have jurisdiction. Id. After considering both Indrelunasand Mallis, the court made three
statements: (1) Indrelunas is still the law in that a timely appeal cannot be defeated by the
argument that the time to appeal began to run from some earlier document; (2) this
decision does not change the law when the appellee objects to the failure to enter the
judgment as a separate document; and (3) it remains the better practice to have the
judgment entered as a separate document and, if an appellant realizes that there is no
separate document, that appellant should make a motion to have one entered. Id. at 284;
see also Baker v. Mercedes Benz of North Am., 114 F.3d 57, 61 (5th Cir. 1997) (remanding
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Hammack v. Baroid Corp.,178 an appellee tried to rely on the First Circuit's
decision in Fiore, arguing that an appellant should not be allowed to
bring an appeal outside a reasonable amount of time. 17 The court was
not swayed by the appellee's arguments in support of adopting the Fiore
system and stated that appeals have been allowed through a Mallis
waiver only when neither party objects and strict application of Rule 58
would prove pointless and burdensome. 180
5. The Sixth Circuit: Try Everything Once and Things That Work, Try
Again
The Sixth Circuit has continued to favor Indrelunasto Mallis, waiving
Rule 58 only once and then without discussion. 81 The court has denied

case to district court to enter a Rule 58 separate document judgment when the status of a
post-trial motion is unclear due to the lack of a Rule 58 judgment); Whitaker v. City of
Houston, Tex., 963 F.2d 831, 833-34 (5th Cir. 1992) (accepting jurisdiction notwithstanding
the lack of a Rule 58 document, but only after stating that the Mialas decision leaves the
option open to the appellate courts whether they want to accept jurisdiction).
M142 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 1998).
'79 Id. at 268.
Joe Hammack sued Baroid Corporation seeking coverage under the
company's health plan for his wife's hospital bills. Id. at 267. The Hammacks sued in state
court and the corporation removed to federal court ld at 268. Following a bench trial, the
District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that Baroid did not abuse its
discretion in determining the Hammacks' benefits. Id. The court submitted factual
findings and conclusions of law in a seven page order on which the court stated: "FINAL
JUDGMENT should issue. It is so ORDERED." Id. The court failed to file a separate
document judgment order pursuant to Rule 58. Id. Twenty months after the order was
issued, Hammack requested a judgment order be entered by the district court. Id. The
court then entered a single-page document order. Id. Baroid argued that Hannack had
waived his right to appeal by waiting twenty months before requesting the entry of a
document order. Id. The appellate court considered the method employed by the First
Circuit under the Fiore decision and rejected the method because strict application of a rule
like that in Fiore would result in extinguishing a party's right to appeal. Id. at 269.
180 Id. The court also examined the only other circuit decision at the time regarding Fiore.
Id. at 269 n.4 (citing Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 1998 US. App. LEXIS 9004, at
*20, vacated in part on othergrounds, 143 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1998)). The Sixth Circuit had also
refused to follow Fiore, finding it to be a pragmatic solution but not a solution yet approved
by the Supreme Court. Id. The court did note, however, that the twenty-month delay
seemed exceptionally long, especially considering the fact that Hammack was completely
silent on the lack of a judgment order throughout those months. Id. at 269 n.6.
18 Green v. Nevers, 196 F.3d 627, 631 (6th Cir. 1999). Malice Green died at the hands of
several Detroit police officers on November 5, 1992. Id. at 629. Green's estate brought
wrongful death and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the City of Detroit, which were settled
for $5.25 million. Id. The district court finalized this settlement in a consent judgment on
July 18, 1994. Id. This decision was not filed in compliance with the Rule 58 separate
judgment rule. Id. at 631. One of the attorneys appealed a subsequent order of the district
court denying his motion for discovery concerning the validity of the contingency fee
agreement between the estate and the estate's attorneys and denying him any share in the
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appeals where there was no apparent reason for the absence of a Rule 58
document from the district court.1 8 The court has also consistently
dismissed appeals when there was no Rule 58 separate document
judgment order from the district courts. 1 3 Additionally, the court has
held that Mallis could be used against the appellant unless the appellant
could show he was somehow misled, but then the court overturned this
reading of Rule 58 and Mallis.184

B. The Needfor Uniformity Within the FederalCourts
It is true that uniformity in [procedure]is most desirable.1 83

accrued interest on the escrow settlement funds. Id. at 629. Although the appeal was three
days late, the court found that the lack of a Rule 58 judgment order in the district court
meant that the time for appeal had not yet begun to run when the notice of appeal was
filed. Id. at 631. As a result, the court found the appeal timely and declared itself to have
jurisdiction. Id. In a footnote, the court stated that Mallis allows a court to waive the
requirements of Rule 58 in cases of "premature" appeals in order to obtain appellate
review. Id. at 631 n.3.
182 See, e.g., Anderson v. Pierce, No. 84-5996, 1985 WL 12815, at *1 (6th Cir. July 19, 1985).
The court concluded that the lack of a Rule 58 judgment order could not be excused in this
case because it would prejudice the appellant and there was some uncertainty about
whether the final action of the district court was meant to be a final judgment Id.
13 See Telxon Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 00-3596, 2000 WL 1175555, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 11,
2000) (dismissing the appeal because it lacked a Rule 58 judgment); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n
v. Great Lakes Equities, Co., Nos. 91-1354, 91-1405, 91-1525, 1991 WL 88417, at '1 (6th Cir.
May 28,1991) (granting a motion to dismiss when there was no Rule 58 order and denying
a motion to stay as moot); Rapp Bus. Corp. v. Eslinger, No. 87-3727, 1987 WL 38903, at *1
(6th Cir. Nov. 10,1987) (granting a motion to dismiss until a judgment order was entered in
the district court docket pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58); Salyers v. Sec'y of
Health and Human Servs., No. 85-5237, 1986 WL 16905, at *3-4 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 1986)
(remanding the case to the district court for prompt entry of an order denying a
preliminary injunction and class certification upon a separate document in conformity with
Rule 58); cf.Reid v. White Motor Corp., 886 F.2d 1462, 1466-67 (6th Cir. 1989) (allowing an
untimely appeal where appellant proved that the clerk of the court made an error entering
the separate document and, therefore, the appellant was never notified that the judgment
was final).
'8 Amoco Oil Co. v. Jim Heilig Oil & Gas Inc., No. 85-1619,1986 WL 16570, at 1 (6th Cir.
Feb. 7, 1986). In Amoco Oil, the decision was entered May 21,1985, and the notice of appeal
was filed on July 25,1985, making it thirty-five days late. Id. The court of appeals issued a
show cause order, and the appellant responded by stating that the appeal was prematurely
fied because no separate document judgment order had been entered by the district court.
Id. However, a review of the district court record revealed that the appellant was not
misled by the failure to enter a separate judgment. Id. Appellant's counsel recognized the
May 21 decision as a final decision and sought reconsideration of the court's decision. Id.
Therefore, the appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the
appeal was untimely. Id.
15 Supreme Court Adopts Rules, supra note 29, at 99 (citing a 1912 resolution presented by
Thomas Shelton to the Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure).
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Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
uniformity existed in federal courts only in equity.' 86 With respect to
actions at law, partial compliance to state practice was required.187 This
resulted in forty-nine different types of procedure in the federal courts,
one for each state in the union at the time and one for the District of
Columbia.'18 One of the preliminary questions the Advisory Committee
considered was whether to adopt rules that would unify the federal
courts under one system of procedure.' 8 ' The Committee opted for
uniformity throughout the federal courts because it would be
incongruous and unreasonable for different rules on the same topics to
prevail in different districts. 190 The goal was a simplified practice that
would strip procedure of unnecessary technicalities."'1
Uniformity is necessary throughout the federal courts to provide a

fixed rule of decision and stability and certainty in claims rather than
allowing circuits to create their own jurisprudence. 192 A codification of
federal procedure eliminates the confusion resulting from separate

courts following their own rules." 3 "[T]he law is meaningless when

186Holtzoff, Judge, supra note 45, at 157; see also Goodman, supra note 16, at 353 (stating that

the practical result of the Conformity Act was the creation of as many different federal
rules for practice as there were different state rules, thus eliminating any uniformity of
procedure in the federal courts).
18 Holtzoff, ]udge, supra note 45, at 157; see also notes 17-20 and accompanying text
(describing the effects of the Conformity Act and its system of federal courts following "as
near as may be" to the state rules).
188Holtzoff, ]rdge, supra note 45, at 157; see also Sunderland, supra note 23, at 1117
(commenting on the importance of uniformity to the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure after the Conformity Act had failed to bring about a general conformity in
federal and state proceedings).
189
Holtzoff, Origin, supra note 29, at 1062; see also Sunderland, supra note 23, at 1117 (stating
that all federal statutes in conflict with the rules would be repealed and a five-member
Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure would be elected); Supreme Court Adopts Rules,
supra note 29, at 98 (stating that the duty of the Advisory Committee was to prepare and
submit a draft of a uniform system of rules).
190 Holtzoff, Origin, supra note 29, at 1062. Additionally, the hope was expressed that if a
uniform system were promulgated and were found satisfactory, some of the states might
adopt the Rules for their own courts. Id. This hope proved to be prophetic as several of the
states had already accepted federal civil procedure in its entirety for their local tribunals by
1955. Id.; see also Sunderland, supra note 23, at 1117 (stating that the drafters of the rules
believed that the rules would be models for state adoption).
19 Goodman, supra note 16, at 356 (citing a 1935 speech given by Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes to the American Law Institute).
19 Subrin, supra note 21, at 950 (citing Thomas Shelton, Simplification of Legal Procedure Expediency Must Not Sacrifice Principle,71 CENT. L J.330,333 (1910)).
19Sunderland, supra note 23, at 1124.
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enforced, without regard to fixed rules of [civil] procedure."194
Specifically, Rule 58 has been rewritten twice in attempts to eliminate
ambiguity and promote uniform application of the rule.1' 5 The previous

uncertainties in Rule 58 caused litigants grief, and the amendments set
out to eliminate the discrepancies." 6 A case-by-case approach had not
worked in the past, and a mechanical approach was necessary to avoid
any new uncertainties. 1 7

C. A ProposedAmendment to Rule 58
In April 2000, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee met and
discussed potential amendments to Rule 58.19 The proposed changes to

194Subrin, supra note 21, at 949 (citing Thomas Shelton, Simplification of Legal Procedure Expediency Must Not Sacrifice Principle, 71 CENT. L J.330, 333 (1910)).
1M Benjamin Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (II), 77
HARV. L REv. 801, 831 (1964); see also Sunderland, supra note 23, at 1129 (stating that
constant attention is required to ensure the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are adjusted to
contemporary needs); supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text (discussing the 1946 and
1963 amendments to Rule 58).
196 United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216,220 (1973) (per curiam).
Five years later, the Supreme Court stated that technical application of
19 Id. at 221-22
Rule 58 should not prevent parties from waiving the separate document requirement
where one was accidentally not entered. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 386
(1978).
198 COMMrTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNTrED STATES, PROPOSED REPORT OF THE CrvIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (proposed

May 2000) (to be codified at 28 U-S.C. app. at 783), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/comment2J0/amendments/cv.pdf (last visited June 11, 2002) [hereinafter Proposed
Rule 58]. The committee met on April 10 and 11, 2000, at the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts in Washington, D.C. Id. The amendments would eliminate the
current Rule 58 and replace it with:
Rule 58. Entry of Judgment
(a)
Separate Document
Every judgment and amended judgment must be
(1)
set forth on a separate document but a separate
document is not required for an order disposing of
a motion:
for judgment under Rule 50(b);
(A)
(B)
to amend or make additional findings of
fact under Rule 52(b);
(C)
for attorney fees under Rule 54;
for a new trial, or to alter or amend the
(D)
judgment, under Rule 59; or
(E)
for relief under Rule 60.
(2)
Subject to Rule 54(b):
the clerk must, without awaiting the
(A)
court's direction, promptly prepare,
sign, and enter the judgment when:
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Rule 58(a) would preserve the core of the separate document
requirement both for the initial judgment and for any amended
judgment.9 9 Proposed section 58(a) lists the judgments that would not
require a separate document judgment order.20 Additionally, proposed

(i)

the jury returns a general
verdict;
(ii)
the the court awards only
costs or a sum certain, or
denies all relief
(B)
the court must promptly approve the
form of the judgment, which the clerk
must promptly enter, when:
(i)
the jury returns a special
verdict or a general verdict
accompanied
by
interrogatories, or
(ii)
the court grants other relief
not described in Rule 58(a)(2).
(b)
Time of Entry. Judgment is entered for purposes of Rules 50,
52 54(d)(2)(B), 59,60, and 62:
(1)
when it is entered in the civil docket under Rule
79(a), and
(2)
if the separate document is required by Rule
58(a)(1), upon the earlier of these events:
(A)
when it is set forth on a separate
document, or
(B)
when 60 days have run from entry on
the civil docket under Rule 79(a).
(c)
Cost or Fee Awards.
(1)
Entry of judgment may not be delayed, nor the
time for appeal extended, in order to tax costs or
award fees, except as provided in Rule 58(c)(2).
(2)
When a timely motion for attorney fees is made
under Rule 54(d)(2) the court may act before a
notice of appeal has been filed and has become
effective to order that the motion have the same
effect under Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal rules of
Appellate Procedure as a timely motion under
Rule 59.
(d)
Request for Entry. A party may request that judgment be set
forth on a separate document as required by Rule 58(a)(1).
Id. Additionally, but separately, the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules has
introduced an amendment to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, which would allow
judgment to be entered on a claim after 150 days when a judgment order was not entered
by the district court. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MINUTES OF FALL 1999
MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMrrEE ON APPELLATE RULES, available at 1999 WL 1993044, at *12 The accompanying notes to the amendment state that the committee wished to
introduce a cap so that appeals would not be allowed to run indefinitely. Id. at *4.
'I See Proposed Rule 58, supra note 198, § 58(a).
2WId.
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section (a) divides the responsibility for the separate document order
between the judge and the clerk of the court.2m
As proposed, Rule 58(b) discards the attempt to define when a
judgment becomes "effective" and instead contains a provision that is
aimed directly at the time for making post-trial and post-judgment
motions. 2m If judgment is promptly set forth on a separate document, as

Rule 58 requires, the new provision will not change the effect of Rule
58.20
3 But in the cases in which the court and clerk fail to comply with

this simple requirement, the motion time periods set by other procedural
rules begin to run after expiration of sixty days from entry of the
judgment on the civil docket.20

The language in the amendment to section 58(c) preserves the
majority of the language from the current Rule 58.2 The proposed
section 58(d) replaces the current provision that does not allow attorneys
to submit forms of judgment except on direction of the court.2 °6 The

express direction in Rule 58(a)(2) calls for prompt action by the clerk and
the court, thus addressing the concern of inept drafting by attorneys.207
The new provision allows any party to move for entry of judgment on a
separate document, which, the Committee stated, will protect all needs
for prompt commencement of the periods for motions, appeals, and
execution of other enforcement. 208

"I Id. § 58(a)(2). The derk must promptly prepare, sign and enter the judgment. Id.
§ 58(a)(2)(A). The judge must then approve the document in a timely fashion. Id.
§ 58(a)(2)(B).
v2 Id. § 58(b). The Committee acknowledged that the current system under Rule 58 could
"cause strange difficulties in implementing pre-trial orders that are appealable under
interlocutory appeal provisions or under expansive theories of finality." NOTES FROM THE
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE

UNITED STATES, availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2OO1/amendments/
cv.pdf at 112 (last visited June 11, 2002) [hereinafter COMMrrEE NOTES].
2m See Proposed Rule 58, supra note 198, § 58(b).
Id. The committee specifically mentioned Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 52, 54,59,
and 60. COMMITrEE NOTES, supra note 202, at 111. Entry on the civil docket is required by
Rule 79(a). Id. at 112. The committee is also recommending a companion amendment to
Appellate Rule 4(a)(7), which integrates these changes with the time to appeal. Id.
2 See Proposed Rule 58, supra note 198, § 58(c).
Id. § 58(d). This provision was added to Rule 58 to avoid the delays that were frequently
encountered by the former practice of directing the attorneys for the prevailing party to
prepare a form of judgment, and also to avoid the occasionally inept drafting that resulted
from attorney-prepared judgments. CoMmrrrEE NOTES, supra note 202, at 114; see also
WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 47, § 2786.
207See Proposed Rule 58, supranote 198, § 58(d).
m Id.
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The Committee acknowledged that Rule 58's purpose is to provide
that a judgment is effective only when set forth on a separate document
However, the Committee
and entered as provided in Rule 79(a).2 9
found that this simple requirement has been ignored in many cases. 10
When this requirement is ignored, the time for making certain motions
and the time for appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a) never begins to run.2 1
The amendment proposed by the Committee is designed to work with
Appellate Rule 4(a) to ensure that time for appeal does not linger
indefinitely. Additionally, the Committee wished to maintain the
212
integration of the time periods set forth in other civil procedure rules.
IV. CONTRIBUTION

Rule 58 currently requires clerks to file a separate document in every
case. n 3 This signals the parties that the district court has entered
judgment on a case and the thirty days for appeal may begin. However,
when the clerk fails to do so, appellate courts must attempt to determine
the finality of the district court's decision. Circuits disagree over
whether appellate courts must immediately accept jurisdiction when
there is no separate document, as well as whether cases must be
remanded to district courts for a separate document to be entered before
appellate courts may accept jurisdiction. Additionally, there is conflict
among the circuits as to how many days or months may pass before a
claim is considered extinguished when the district court has not filed a
separate document.
The Supreme Court decisions regarding Rule 58 have been
contradictory. The Supreme Court first ruled that Rule 58 must be
"mechanically applied"; fiveyears later, the Court ruled that Rule 58 is
not a jurisdictional requirement.2 1 4 The circuits interpret the conflicting
Supreme Court decisions in disparate ways, dismissing some appeals
outside the thirty-day mark and allowing other appeals that are filed
years after the district court's final decision. This lack of uniformity

See COMMITTEE NOTE, supra note 202, at 111.
21oId.

211Id. Specifically, the Committee mentions that the times for making motions under

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50, 52 54(d)(2)(B), and 59, and some motions under Rule
60, never begin to run Id. The Committee mentions that there have been "many and
horridly confused problems" with respect to Rule 58 and Appellate Rule 4(a). Id. The goal

of the Committee was to create a Rule 58 where there was no potential for claims to
continue indefinitely. Id.
22 Id.
213
214

See FED. R. Civ. P. 58; see also supranote 5 (reproducing Rule 58).
See supra Part II.C.
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contradicts the very purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which was to bring all the federal courts under one system of procedural
rules.
An amendment has been proposed to remedy some of the Rule 58
uncertainties. The proposed amendment reiterates the necessity for a
separate document in all final judgments. In addition, the amendment
requires that clerks promptly prepare, sign, and enter the judgment. If a
separate document is entered by the clerk, the amendment states that
judgment is entered, and the time for appeal may begin. However, if a
separate document has not been entered by the clerk, the amendment
states that the judgment is considered entered after sixty days. The
amendment repeats the current Rule 58 language in allowing separate
documents to be entered before awards are made for costs or fees,
allowing an appeal to go forward on the merits even where the court has
not yet ruled on attorney's fees. Finally, the amendment states that
either party may request that a separate document be entered to signal
that all claims are concluded in the court and the time for appeal is ripe.
The proposed amendment makes great strides in correcting the
current Rule 58 controversies. However, the amendment goes too far. It
guarantees that all claims will be final judgments from the district court
within sixty days. 2 s This is a problem because the district court will not
be required to enter a Rule 58 separate document judgment order.
Therefore, the parties may not realize that the district court's judgment
was intended to be a final judgment and that the time for the appeal is
running. The amendment extinguishes appeals for the sake of judicial
certainty. Instead, judges need some flexibility when a party can prove
that the time for appeal ran without any warning.
To prevent prejudice to the appellee or to recognize the presence of
exceptional circumstances, this Note proposes the following amendment
to Rule 58(b):
(b) Time of Entry. Judgment is entered for purposes of Rules 50, 52,
54(d)(2)(B), 59, 60, and 62:
(1) when it is entered in the civil docket under Rule 79(a), and

21s

See Proposed Rule 58, supra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing the sixty-day

requirement).
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(2) if a separate document is required by Rule 58(a)(1), upon the
earlier of these events, absent exceptional circumstances or prejudice
to appellee:
(A) when it is set forth on a separate document, or
(B) when 60 days have run from entry on the civil docket under
216
Rule79(a).
Adding the phrase "absent exceptional circumstances or prejudice to
appellee" grants the courts some discretion to apply when an appellant
is unaware that the time to appeal has already run. This is similar to the
current systems applied by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, where
21 7
waivers are only allowed when there is no prejudice to the appellee.
The burden of proof would be on the appellant to show that there was
either some prejudice or the presence of exceptional circumstances. The
appellant would also be required to prove that allowing an untimely
appeal would not prejudice the appellee. This burden would be
appropriately high, but possible if the plaintiff had been completely
unaware that the district court's action was meant to be a final action,
and thus, start the appeal clock running.
Although not yet enacted, the proposed amendment has already
been the subject of some controversy, especially Section 58(b)(2)(B) and
the new sixty-day rule. The Supreme Court of Texas noted in dicta that
the proposed amendment would ensure that every case would be closed
within sixty days.218 Although this is true, the amendment would also
make it more likely that a party would be unaware that the time for
appeal is running because the party does not know of the clerk's entry
on the civil docket.219 The Texas court was concerned that appellants

216This Note's contribution is the italicized text.
217See supra notes 142-49, 156-62 and accompanying text (discussing the current Rule 58

jurisprudence
of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits).
218
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.2d 191, 205 (rex. 2001).
219Id. The Supreme Court of Texas stated that the easiest way to clear up controversy
regarding Rule 58 was to ensure that a separate document judgment order was entered on
the civil docket for every judgment Id. However, the court also recognized that the
current Rule 58's certainty is accompanied by a lack of a final date for a judgment to be
considered to be entered. Id. The court stated that the proposed amendments to Rule 58
would ensure that every case would be closed within sixty days, but it also makes it more
likely that a party will be unaware that the time for appeal has started to rum Id. The court
ended its analysis of the proposed amendments by pointing out that the Texas Court's
Advisory Committee was presently studying the issues of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 58
and had yet to decide on a solution which would solve every problem. Id.
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would be unaware that their thirty days for appeal were running
because the district court had not entered a judgment order on the civil
docket to let them know that the case was ripe for appeal.2
The controversial sixty-day rule is similar in effect to the First
Circuit's ninety-day rule pronounced in Fiore v. Washington County
Community Mental Health Center.221 In Fiore, the First Circuit held that
parties would have ninety days to appeal from the final action of the
district court where there was no Rule 58 judgment order.m2 Several
other circuits have rejected this system for its unfairness to appellants.=
The circuits have found that it is unnecessarily fatal to appeals.2 4 The
Committee's proposed amendment reduces the amount of time from
ninety to sixty days, thereby extinguishing even more appeals.225
The "Mallis" waiver system, presently available only in certain
federal circuits, has increased the controversy and has resulted in an
increased lack of uniformity between the circuits Z6 A "Mallis" waiver is
established when a party appeals from a judgment and the opposing
party does not contest the appeal on the basis of the separate document
requirement. 27 However, not all of the circuit appellate courts have
accepted jurisdiction through a "Mallis" waiver and some circuits accept
jurisdiction only when there is no prejudice to the appellee or where
neither party objects. 22m Objections based solely on the separate
document rule are rare, because the appeal is often either allowed to
continue regardless of the lack of a judgment order or is simply
remanded to the district court where the appellant gains another thirty

l2DId.
(stating that the amendment "makes it more likely that a party will not be aware that

the time for appeal is running ...
because he does not know of the derk's entry on the civil
docket").

' See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the First Circuit's approach to Rule 58 in Fiore).
m Fiore v. Washington County Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 960 F.2d 229, 239 (1st Cir. 1992)
(stating that a judgment becomes final three months after the last action in a case).
2
See New Shows v. Don King Prods., Inc., Nos. 99-9019, 99-9069, 2000 WL 354214, at *5-6
(2d Cir. Apr. 6, 2000); United States v. Haynes, 158 F.2d 1327, 1330-30 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Hammack v. Baroid Corp., 142 F.3d 266, 270 (5th Cir. 1998); Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox &
Dunn, 110 F.3d 1247,1253 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated in part on other grounds, 143 F.3d 263
(6th Or. 1998).
n See New Shows, 2000 WL 354214, at *5-6; Haynes, 158 F.2d at 1330-30; Hammack, 142 F.3d
at 270; Rubin, 110 F.3d at 1253 & n.4, vacated in part on othergrounds,143 F.3d 263.
M See Proposed Rule 58, supra note 198, § 58(b)(2)(B) (proposing the sixty-day rule).
m See supra Part IIL.A (discussing the state of Rule 58 jurisprudence throughout the federal
circuits).
2v See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text (listing the elements of a "Ma/i's" waiver);
see also Zachary, supra note 50, at 410-11.
m See supra Part III.A (discussing the current Rule 58 jurisprudence in the federal courts).
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days before he must file an amended notice of appeal 229 The primary
advantage to objecting on the grounds of a Rule 58 deficiency is that the
appellee gains the amount of time it takes for the case to return to the
appellate court after being remanded. 230 However, even this advantage
has its dangers because the appellate court judges may see the Rule 58
objection as a delay tactic and rule the separate document requirement to
be waived regardless. 231
The proposed amendment suggested by this Note would allow a
Rule 58 waiver only where the appellant can prove exceptional
circumstances and overcome any claim of unjust prejudice that may be
raised by the appellee. The burden of proof would be squarely on the
appellant who would need to specifically plead for the waiver. The
appellate courts would not possess the power to find that a waiver exists
when the appellant has failed to raise it. Also, this would give the
appellee an opportunity to plead prejudice and leave the court to balance
the pleadings of the appellant and the appellee. This would result in a
higher burden of proof for the appellant, which is appropriate because
the appellant is attempting to bring an untimely appeal.
The amendment proposed by this Note, if adopted, would impact
the hypothetical situations discussed in Part I.=3 In Moss' situation,
including the additional language in the proposed amendment would
put the burden of proof on Moss to show that there were exceptional
circumstances that caused his notice of appeal to be late. Moss would
need to specifically plead that he was unaware that the time for appeal
had already run. Moss would likely be unable to accomplish this
because he did not address the appellate court's questions as to his
lateness. In addition, the amendment would allow the appellee in Moss'
claim to show that he would be prejudiced in some way if Moss' late
appeal were allowed to continue. Moss would need to overcome the
pleadings of the appellee and show that the appellee would not be
unjustly prejudiced if he was allowed to bring his late appeal. Applying
the amendment, the appellate court would have the discretion to balance
Moss' claim of exceptional circumstances against the appellee's claim of
unfair prejudice. The court would have discretion to allow Moss
additional time in which to file his notice of appeal. Thus, Moss could
not simply ignore the demands of the court as he did in the hypothetical.

M2
Zachary, supra note 50, at 410-11.
m Id. at 411.
231[d.

2

See supra Part I.
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If he did, his late notice of appeal would not be allowed because he
would not have met his burden of proof.
Lyman, on the other hand, would still have some hope for
continuing with her appeal. Because Lyman filed her notice of appeal
three days too late under Appellate Rule 4(a), she would need to
specifically plead exceptional circumstances. Lyman would need to
show that she was unaware that the district court's action was meant to
be a final judgment. Additionally, she could claim that she was relying
on precedent, albeit from a different circuit. In response, the appellee in
Lyman's case would next have the opportunity to plead that unjust
prejudice would result should Lyman's appeal be allowed to continue.
Because only three days passed since the time the notice of appeal
should have been filed, unjust prejudice will be more difficult for the
appellee to prove than it was in Moss' case. The appellate court would
then need to decide whether Lyman's circumstances were such that her
appeal should not be extinguished because she had no notice from the
district court that her claim was finalized. In such a case, even if
Lyman's appeal was more than three days late, the appellate court
would have the discretion to allow Lyman to bring her appeal.
Requiring the appellant to show exceptional circumstances and a
lack of prejudice to the appellee will reduce the number of plaintiffs who
will use Rule 58 to their tactical advantage. An appellant will be less
likely to attempt to bring a late appeal in bad faith realizing that the
appellate court has the discretion to dismiss the appeal absent
exceptional circumstances.
Also, the addition to the proposed
amendment will focus the responsibility of proving that the late notice of
appeal should be allowed on the appellant. Currently, appellate courts
often raise Rule 58 jurisdictional questions sua sponte and then remand or
waive Rule 58 altogether. The Committee's amendment supplemented
by the additional language proposed by this Note requires the appellant
to prove exceptional circumstances and overcome any claims of unjust
prejudice before the appellate court will have discretion to hear a late
appeal.
V. CONCLUSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 dictates that a separate document
judgment order be entered by the court clerk at the end of every case.
When Rule 58 is not followed, appellate courts experience confusion
over whether all the claims have been adjudicated in the district court.
Currently, the federal circuits are applying a variety of methods to
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remedy this problem. There is a proposed amendment that would alter
Rule 58 substantially to promote judicial certainty. However, this
amendment does not consider situations where the appellant is unaware
that the time to appeal has begun. The amendment needs additional
wording to allow appellate courts some discretion when an appellant
can prove exceptional circumstances and can overcome any claims of
unjust prejudice by the appellee.
Daniel S. Tomson
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